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ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE:
DOES IT DEFY THE RULES?
Amanda Cohen Leiter
I. INTRODUCTION
Cleaning up environmental contamination is a costly business. Re-
cent estimates indicate the total remaining costs of decontaminating pol-
luted U.S. sites could range from $150 to $250 billion,' and the property-
and-casualty insurance industry could ultimately be responsible for one-
to two-thirds of this amount.- Further, these figures do not account for
environmental tort claims (or "toxic torts"), which an author estimated in
the early 1990s could "add tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars
more to the total environmental liability faced by American businesses
over the next two decades."'
Unsurprisingly, allocating these enormous-and uncertain-costs
among polluters, insurers, and taxpayers is itself an expensive enterprise.
Among other difficulties, pollution is frequently first discovered miles
away from-and years after-the original spill, making it nearly impos-
sible to determine who bears responsibility for cleaning up a contami-
nated site. As a result, polluters, insurers, government agencies, and
other affected parties spend billions of dollars per year in litigation over
the cleanup of polluted sites.4
"Law clerk to the Honorable Judge Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000; M.S., University of Washington, 1996:
M.S., Stanford University, 1992; B.S., Stanford University, 1991. The Author would like to
thank Mike Leiter, Eli Cohen, and Professors Christine Jolls, Richard Lazarus, and J.B.
Rul for their comments on various drafts of this Note.
'Melody A. Hamel, The 1970 Pollution F-rclusion in Comprehensive General Liability
Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ.
L. Rev. 1083, 1089-90 (1996).
2 See Ultimate A&E Costs: The Range Narrows. BESTWEEK PROPERTY/CASL'LTY
SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 8, 1997, at P/C 6 (estimating, as of year-end 1996, that the environ-
mental costs of U.S. insurers would ultimately range from S45 to S73 billion).
3 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: AN AN.'ALYSIS
OF Toxic TORT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 1 119911 [herein-
after ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE).
4 For example, surveys suggest that as of 1995, insurers and private polluters alone
spent almost S1 billion annually in litigation relating to cleanup of the country's most
contaminated hazardous waste sites. See Insurance Services Office, Superfund and the
Izsurance Issues Surrounding Abandoned Hazardous Ilaste Sites (Dec. 1995). at http:/l
www.iso.com/docslstud003.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2000) (on file with the Hararl Envi-
ronmental Law Review). This Insurance Services Office ("ISO") survey only discusses the
costs of cleaning up those hazardous waste sites identified by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). suggesting
that the annual transaction costs involved in allocating liability for cleanup of other con-
taminated sites-as well as for personal injury and property damage to third parties-are
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The inherent complexity of these environmental cost-allocation dis-
putes, as well as the vast amounts of money at stake, suggest the need for
a simple theoretical model with which to analyze the implications of
various assignments of environmental cleanup costs. Such a model would
enable analysts to evaluate algorithms for assigning costs to polluters,
liability insurers, victims or their personal insurers, and society to deter-
mine which distribution best advances the (possibly conflicting) goals of
compensating victims, deterring future pollution events, and cleaning up
the mess.
One such theoretical model is the oft-cited model of insurance de-
veloped by Steven Shavell.5 Building on a few simple assumptions, the
model enables Shavell to reach surprisingly broad conclusions about li-
ability insurance. For example, the model suggests that although liability
insurance usually benefits society, there are some situations in which so-
ciety should limit the availability of such insurance to ensure that poten-
tial injurers have adequate incentives to behave cautiously to reduce the
risks posed by their activities. The Shavell model was developed to ad-
dress questions of third-party liability for personal injuries, however, so
it is not immediately clear that the model's conclusions are directly ap-
plicable to disputes involving environmental insurance.
This Note evaluates the suitability of the Shavell model for analysis
of environmental insurance coverage disputes, first applying the model to
several recurring, real-world environmental cost-allocation disputes, and
then using the results of this analysis to critique the model itself. Part II
of the Note outlines the fundamentals of Shavell's model. Part III then
introduces the real-world disputes that will be used to evaluate the
model: six contentious issues concerning coverage of pollution events
under various versions of the ubiquitous Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity ("CGL") insurance policy.6 In Part IV, the model is applied to these
disputes, and the model's recommendations are considered from the
points of view of polluters, liability insurers, victims, and the public.7
Ultimately, the analysis in Part IV indicates that many of the dis-
putes outlined in Part III should be resolved in favor of liability insurers
(that is, against coverage). Such a recommendation, however, would al-
low some insolvent polluters to escape liability for personal injuries and
property damage caused by their actions-not to mention the costs of
cleanup. This outcome may be correct; that is, it may be true that in some
even higher. See id.
5See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, chs. 8-10
(1987) [hereinafter SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Steven Shavell, On the Social Func-
tion and the Regulation of Liability Insurance (2000) (working paper, on file with the Har.
vard Environmental Law Review) [hereinafter Shavell, Regulation of Insurance].
6 In 1986, the insurance industry changed the title of the standard COL policy to
"Commercial General Liability." See Hamel, supra note 1, at 1087 n.25.
"The public" is used here to represent taxpayers, who may have to bear the costs of
compensating victims in cases in which injurers are insolvent and insurance is unavailable.
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circumstances, to maximize deterrence of future pollution events, society
should allow insolvent polluters to escape the consequences of their ac-
tions.' On the other hand, this uncomfortable outcome may instead reflect
certain shortcomings of Shavell's model as applied to environmental
losses. Part V of the Note suggests such a shortcoming: the model, which
focuses on injuries to individuals, overemphasizes the deterrence and
risk-spreading functions of insurance, and underemphasizes the compen-
sation function. This deliberate underemphasis of the compensation
function of liability insurance may not be justified in the environmental
context, for two basic reasons: first, many environmental accidents in-
volve losses to the commons rather than to private individuals, and no
suitable analog to first-party insurance exists for such public losses; sec-
ond, even in situations involving only private victims, first-party insur-
ance may prove an inefficient and ineffective source of compensation for
victims of environmental losses. This finding, in turn, calls into question
the use-without modification-of standard economic models of insur-
ance for evaluation of environmental insurance disputes.
The Note concludes by advocating a partial solution to the discor-
dance between the Shavell model and reality in the environmental con-
text. This solution-incorporating in the model a recommendation that
society require proof-of-solvency before a firm can engage in an activity
that poses a significant environmental risk--is not a panacea, but it
would make the Shavell model a more useful tool for analysis of future
environmental insurance disputes.'0
II. THE SHAVELL INSURANCE MODEL
The basic conclusions of the Shavell model can be stated quite sim-
ply. The model suggests broadly that "liability insurance is socially de-
sirable" because it protects parties from the risk of liability without "'un-
duly" interfering with the deterrence functions of that liability." Further,
s This statement may not make immediate sense, but Shaveil's model does suggest that
there are circumstances in which society should prevent judgment-proof potential polluters
from purchasing liability insurance to maximize the polluters' incentives to exercise care.
See infra Part II.C.7.
9 Several prominent environmental statutes already include such a requirement. See.
e.g., CERCLA § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1994) (imposing financial responsibility require-
ments for vessel owners and operators and for hazardous waste facilities); Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 ("OPA") § 1016, 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (1994) (imposing financial responsibility
requirements for oil transport vessel owners and operators).
10 Of course, one way in which a firm may choose to prove solvency is through the
purchase of liability insurance. As discussed below, this solution may still be available t in
modified form) even in a regime in which society has chosen to limit the availability of
such coverage. See infra Part V.B.
" Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 2. As this assertion suggests.
Shavell emphasizes the risk-spreading and deterrence functions of liability insurance from
the outseL
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the model indicates that in most circumstances, regulation of liability
insurance is unnecessary because parties themselves choose the socially
optimal level of insurance.' 2 In some situations, however, the model ad-
vocates societal regulation of the liability insurance market to optimize
parties' incentives to reduce risk. In particular, the model recommends
mandating coverage in situations in which an insurer is able to monitor
an insured's behavior, but "forbidding coverage[ ] ... when insurers are
not able to monitor insured behavior."
1 3
To analyze the applicability of these conclusions to questions of en-
vironmental liability, one must first be familiar with the structure of the
model. This Part begins by explaining the assumptions of the model,
classifying them as simplifying assumptions (those that simplify analysis
but do not necessarily alter the model's conclusions) or as fundamental
assumptions (those that are central to the predictions of the model)." The
model's prescriptive conclusions about liability insurance are then de-
scribed from the ex ante points of view of the insurer, the insured, vic-
tims, and the public. 5 Finally, this Part details several factors that com-
plicate use of the model and briefly discusses some of the real-world
situations in which the model's simplifying and fundamental assumptions
may not hold.
A. Assumptions of the Model
The two fundamental assumptions of the Shavell model relate to in-
surers' and insureds' attitudes toward risk. The premise of all insurance is
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 Clearly, some assumptions that are merely "simplifying" in theory may prove "fun-
damental" in practice. For example, in developing a model of insurance it is helpful to
ignore the costs an insurer will encounter in its attempts to calculate an insured's expected
losses. This assumption is merely "simplifying" in most situations as such costs tire often
small relative to the expected losses involved. If the costs of gathering information about
insureds' expected losses are high relative to the size of the expected losses themselves,
however, the entire model may unravel as there may no longer be any price at which both
insurers and insureds are willing to share or transfer risk. See SHAVELL, ECONONMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 197.
This Note refers to all such assumptions as "simplifying" but the reader should be
aware that they may in some instances prove fundamental to the conclusions of the model.
I' Again, "the public" represents taxpayers, who may be called upon to compensate
victims when no other funds are available. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, the public's
perspective may differ from that of "society," as society's point of view encompasses the
costs incurred by and benefits accruing to all involved parties-the insurer, the insured,
victims, and taxpayers.
On a different note, it is important to point out that in many situations, liability insur-
ance and government tax coffers are not the only sources of funds to compensate victims,
For example, a victim's injuries may be covered by her first-party medical insurance.
When alternate sources of funds are available, the compensation function of tort liability
(and, in turn, consideration of the taxpayer's point of view) becomes less relevant. This
issue is discussed in detail below. See infra Parts II.C.6, V.B.
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that "it is always possible for the more risk averse to pay the less risk
averse or the risk neutral to assume risk, so as to leave both better off,"il
In fact, beneficial sharing of risk is even possible among equally risk-
averse parties, as each party (by definition) prefers to face a higher pos-
sibility of a subdivided loss than to face the lower possibility of the entire
loss. 17 If all companies and individuals were risk-neutral, however, insur-
ance would be unavailable and unnecessary because parties would be
unwilling to spend any money to transfer or share risk. Thus, one funda-
mental assumption in applying any insurance model in any context is that
some parties facing potential liability are likely to be risk-averse, or
willing to pay others to take on some of the risk of that liability.", The
second fundamental assumption is that there exists a sufficient number of
such risk-averse parties to enable an insurer to cover the costs of losses
that do occur simply by charging each insured an amount that approxi-
mates the expected value of the insured's losses. 9
In addition to these fundamental assumptions, several of the Shavell
model's simplifying assumptions are also relevant in applying the model
to the pollution context. For example, Shavell assumes that the risks
faced by risk-averse insureds are identical and independent to avoid the
problems caused by adverse selection (which occurs "'when low-risk
members of a pool drop out because the premium is greater than the risk
they bring to the pool"20) and by large correlated risks (such as those
'6 SHAVELL, ECONOIlC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 190.
For those unfamiliar with the terms "risk-neutra' and "risk-averse:" the follo%%ing
definitions may be helpful. "Risk-neutral" parties are, by definition, indifferent between a
large possibility of a small future loss (for example, a 10% chance of losing S 10,000) and a
smaller possibility of a larger future loss (for example, a 5% chance of losing S20.000. as
long as both situations involve an identical expected loss (here, SI.000). See id. at 186. In
contrast, "risk-averse" parties prefer the former scenario, and in fact prefer a certain loss
of $1,000 to either scenario. See id.
An individual is likely to be risk-neutral in some situations and varyingly risk-averse
in others, depending in part on the amount of money at stake relative to her assets. For
instance, someone who has assets worth $10,000 is likely to be risk-neutral with respect to
a potential loss of $10, but may be "quite averse to a risk of a $5,000 loss:' and may be
even more risk-averse in the face of a non-pecuniary loss, such as death or serious bodily
injury, for which no amount of money would adequately compensate. Id. at 189.
A firm's attitude toward risk is more difficult to predict accurately. and it is likely to
depend not only on the firm's assets and the amount of money at stake but also on the de-
gree of control exercised by shareholders (who are likely to be risk-neutral in relation to
any specific situation, as they often structure their investments to reduce their overall expo-
sure) relative to that exercised by managers and employees (who may be more risk-averse.
particularly if salaries and benefits are tied to the firm's profits). See id.
17 See id. at 190-91.
18 Of course, if society mandates that certain individuals or corporations purchase h-
ability insurance, then the assumption that those parties are risk-averse is no longer neces-
sary because they will be required to purchase insurance regardless of their attitudes to-
ward risk.
19 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 192.
20 George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHto ST. L.. 497, 500 (19871.
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posed by a natural disaster).2 In addition, Shavell assumes, at least for
development of the initial model, that there are "no administrative ex-
penses associated with the insurer's operations '22 and that insurers and
insureds are able to calculate accurately the possibility and magnitude of
potential losses.23 Under these assumptions, an insurer "can be virtually
sure of covering its costs by collecting from each insured the expected
value of the amount it will have to pay him.
24
As noted earlier, the conclusions of the Shavell model may hold true
even if these simplifying assumptions are not met, but complete analysis
of the real-world complexity of these situations is beyond the scope of
this Note. In subsequent discussion, therefore, the Note simply identifies
situations in which the model's simplifying assumptions may not hold-
particularly those situations common in the environmental context-and
suggests ways in which the complexity of the real world might alter the
conclusions of the analysis.
B. Conclusions of the Basic Model
Initial development of the Shavell model is most straightforward if
one imagines a simplified universe in which (1) victims' behavior affects
neither the likelihood nor the extent of accidents; z5 (2) all accidents in-
volve purely pecuniary losses; (3) risk levels are known; (4) insurers are
risk-neutral; (5) injurers are risk-averse and face strict liability for their
actions; 26 (6) no injurers are judgment proof;27 and (7) victims are risk-
averse but carry no first-party insurance. The discussion in this section is
therefore limited to this simple situation. These conditions are not, how-
ever, assumptions of the model, and Part II.C discusses the model's pre-
scriptions when these conditions are not met.
21 See SHAVELL, ECONoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 198.
221d. at 192. This assumption defies belief, but as long as the relevant administrative
costs are not exorbitant relative to the expected losses in question, insurers can make up for
such costs by charging slightly higher premiums, reducing the maximum level of coverage
available, or writing policies that include deductibles. The last option reduces insurers'
administrative costs by eliminating all claims for losses below the amount of the deducti-
ble. See id. at 198.
13 See id. at 198 (discussing the changes to the model necessary when these assump-
tions are not met). See also infra Part II.C.3.
24 SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 192. Suppose, for example, that
each insured in an infinitely large population (1) faces a 5% possibility of losing $10,000,
and (2) contracts with the insurer to receive that amount in the event of a loss. Under the
above assumptions (ignoring inflation), the insurer can cover its costs by collecting premi-
ums of $500. See id.
2 That is, the accidents are "unilateral." See id. at 208 n. 1.
26 A necessary component of this condition is that injurers must always be sued by
victims for their actions. See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 2.
27 That is, all injurers have sufficient assets to compensate anyone injured by their ac-
tivities.
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In the simplified universe described above, one can immediately
draw two important preliminary conclusions: first, liability insurance
should be available to all potential injurers, for risk-averse parties are
always willing to pay to transfer or to share some or all of their risk. If
all potential injurers are risk-averse, and the provision of insurance in-
volves no transaction costs, injurers are better off if liability insurance is
available.'
The second conclusion also derives directly from the above assump-
tions: under these conditions, neither victims nor taxpayers have any rea-
son to be concerned about the availability of liability insurance. Even if
no insurance is available, victims are assured of complete and adequate
compensation for their injuries, and taxpayers run no risk that they will
be forced to bear some of the costs of that compensation. That is, the
presence or absence of liability insurance affects only the source of com-
pensation. In fact, in this simple universe, victims and taxpayers need not
worry that the availability of liability insurance might alter insureds' in-
centives to exercise care2 9 because neither has any reason to be concerned
about the frequency of loss. All losses are entirely pecuniary, and victims
will be fully compensated either by injurers or by liability insurers, so
both groups should be entirely indifferent between ex ante reduction of
risk and ex post compensation. 0
1. Irreducible Risks
To reach additional conclusions about the benefits and repercussions
of liability insurance, Shavell divides the potential risks an insured may
face into two categories, which this Note terms "irreducible" and "re-
ducible" risks. The term "irreducible risks" refers to those risks the in-
sured cannot influence through its actions, whereas "reducible risks" are
those risks the insured can abate (or magnify) by increasing (or decreas-
ing) its level of care.3' Applying the Shavell model to irreducible risks
2 See SHAVELL, ECONoIic ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 191. Note also that society as a
whole may be better off if liability insurance is available because such insurance may
"mak[e] the risk averse willing to engage in socially desirable, risky activities:' Id.
29A well-known side-effect of insurance is that it immunizes insureds from liability.
thus reducing their economic incentives to exercise care. This effect. known as "moral
hazard," is discussed at length below. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
30 As Shavell observes, in this situation, "it should not be socially advantageous for the
state to interfere with any contract that injurers happen to make. and in particular with a
contract involving liability insurers." Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5. at 5.
31 See SHAVELL, ECONoMlic ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 193-97.
In the pollution context, a single action is likely to involve both types of risk. For e-
ample, on the one hand, a landfill operator has little control over the frequency of natural
disasters such as floods or earthquakes; the risk that such a disaster will cause leakage
from the landfill is thus at least partially irreducible. On the other hand, the landfill opera-
tor can reduce the likelihood of ill effects due to leakage by lining the landfill with imper-
meable material and strictly controlling the types of substances deposited, suggesting that
the leakage risk is partially reducible.
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suggests that society is better off if all potential injurers are able to pur-
chase full coverage of such risks. This conclusion clearly follows from an
analysis of the options open to an insured. On the one hand, if an insured
purchases insurance with a low coverage ceiling (and pays a corre-
spondingly lower premium), she will find herself paying some money in
the event of a large lOSS.3 2 Because she is risk-averse, she should be
willing to pay a higher premium in the first instance to avoid this out-
come. On the other hand, if she purchases more than full coverage (and
pays a correspondingly higher premium), she is essentially paying in the
present to gamble that a loss will occur. Again, a risk-averse insured
should not be willing to face the sure loss of a higher premium in the
present to obtain the mere possibility of a future gain in the form of a
higher insurance award in the future.33 Clearly, then, risk-averse insureds
and insurers34 should prefer full coverage for irreducible risks. -- As dis-
cussed above,36 however, victims and taxpayers should be entirely indif-
ferent (under present limiting conditions37) about the amount of coverage
purchased for irreducible risks. Thus, society as a whole is best served if
potential injurers are able to purchase full coverage for such risks. Fur-
ther, as long as the insurance industry is competitive,3" this socially ideal
outcome can be reached by negotiation between insurers and insureds,
entirely without regulation.
2. Reducible Risks
Applying the Shavell model to reducible risks is more difficult be-
cause the behavior of the insured becomes relevant. One must consider
not only whether insurance is socially beneficial in the presence of a
fixed risk of loss (as discussed above for irreducible risks), but also
whether the purchase of insurance itself affects the behavior of insureds
in a way that alters the likelihood of loss through the phenomenon of
moral hazard.39
Note that an insured can also cause some types of loss directly. As this situation is
simply the extreme case of a reducible risk (that is, any loss deliberately caused by an
insured could, by definition, have been avoided through exercise of greater care), this Note
includes such situations under the heading "reducible risks."32 See id. at 193.
"3See id.
31 The conclusion that insurers' preferences should align with those of insureds relies
on both the (assumed) absence of uncertainty or transaction costs and the contractual na-
ture of insurance.
3 See STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 193.
36See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
3 For a list of the present conditions, see supra Part II.B. For discussion of the
changes to the model that result when these conditions are relaxed, see infra Part II.C.
31 See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 2.
39 See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 194-95. Liability is imposed,
in part, to induce an injurer to take account of the costs of her behavior and to exercise
increased care, so it is reasonable to suppose that in some instances the transfer of liability
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To determine the importance of moral hazard to Shavell's liability
insurance model, one must consider whether an insured will act in ways
that affect the possibility of loss. The answer to this question depends in
part on an insurer's ability to monitor an insured's behavior.-'" If the in-
surer can accurately determine whether an insured has taken adequate
precautions against loss, then the insurer is likely to draft its liability
policies in ways that reduce the problem of moral hazard. For instance,
the insurer may exclude coverage for losses caused by the insured, or
reduce premiums for insureds who take additional precautions against
loss.4' On the other hand, if the insurer cannot determine an insured's
level of care, the insurer may simply increase policy premiums to reflect
this uncertainty.42 That is, recognizing that the likelihood of a loss could
increase simply as a result of the purchase of insurance, an insurer may
charge a higher premium at the outset to reflect the resulting increase in
the expected loss.
So what level of liability insurance is optimal for reducible risks in
cases in which insurers can easily monitor an insured's level of care? As
Shavell explains, this scenario is essentially identical to that of an irre-
ducible risk, and the problem of moral hazard becomes irrelevant."' Few
insureds will reduce their level of care or deliberately cause a loss if they
know their premiums will rise or coverage will be denied as a result.
Similarly, under the conditions discussed above," the fact that a risk is
reducible will not change the preferences of insurers, victims, and the
public, as long as insurers are able to structure policies to reduce the
problem of moral hazard. Thus, for the same reasons discussed above,
full coverage is optimal for reducible risks in situations in which the in-
surer can monitor the actions of the insured-and again, insurers will
choose this level of coverage without government intervention."
In situations in which the insurer cannot determine the insured's
level of care, however, insureds will not choose full coverage for reduci-
ble risks. Consider the options of a potential polluter-say, a landfill op-
erator-seeking liability coverage for a reducible risk. She can choose to
purchase more-than-full, full, or partial coverage of the risks posed by
through the purchase of insurance might reduce the insured's incentive to take care. This
possibility, that "ownership of insurance might ... dull [an insured's] incentives" to take
actions that would reduce the likelihood of loss, is known as moral hazard and is an im-
portant consideration in the development of insurance policy for reducible risks. Note that
moral hazard is a consideration both in situations in which an insured can herself cause a
loss and in situations in which the insured can simply increase the risk of loss by decreas-
ing her level of care.
4 See id at 195.
41 See idU
42 See id. at 195-96
43 See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5. at 195.
4 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
45 See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5. at 3-4.
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operation of the landfill. 46 As noted above, though, an insurer unable to
monitor the landfill operator's level of care will simply raise the premium
charged for more-than-full or full coverage of potential pollution events,
to counter the effects of moral hazard. 47 Rather than pay this increased
premium, the landfill operator will choose instead to purchase partial
coverage-that is, coverage with a low ceiling or a significant deductible.
With only partial coverage, the landfill operator will bear some of the
costs of any loss; this exposure, in turn, will increase her incentive to
take care; and insurers, recognizing the partial alleviation of the moral
hazard, will charge premiums that more accurately reflect the ex ante
probability of loss. 48 Insurers, too, will prefer to offer only partial cover-
age for this type of risk (or to set rates based on past accident risk) be-
cause they have a strong financial interest in calculating accurately the
probability of loss, and this calculation is made more difficult by the
presence of moral hazard. Finally, victims and taxpayers will remain en-
tirely unconcerned about the availability and form of liability insurance. 9
Thus, partial coverage is socially optimal for reducible risks in the pres-
ence of moral hazard.50 Further, this optimal level of coverage can again
be reached entirely through the insurance market without the need for
government regulation.5
An interesting final aspect of reducible risks is that, as the above
discussion demonstrates, insureds are better off if insurers are able to
46 Of course, she can also choose not to purchase insurance at all, but assuming she is
risk-averse, she will prefer a solution that involves some sharing of risks.
4' Moral hazard is particularly problematic when an insured has purchased more-than-
full coverage of losses, for such coverage provides the insured with an incentive to cause
additional accidents.
48 See SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 196. Note that "[insurcds will
have a similar motive to avoid losses if," instead of purchasing coverage with a low ceiling
or a deductible, they instead purchase policies that "specify that their future premiums or
insurability depend on loss history." Id.
49 Of course, most pecuniary losses involve such significant hassles that a rational vic-
tim may not in fact be indifferent between avoiding injury and receiving compensation,
suggesting that even in case of pecuniary losses resulting from reducible risks, victims
may prefer forms of insurance-such as partial coverage-that minimize the likelihood of
loss. For discussion of victims' preferences when losses are not entirely pecuniary. see
infra Part II.C.2.
-0See SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 195.
SI See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 5.
Even if an insured's policy includes a low ceiling or a deductible, the insured's level of
care will still fall below the cost-justified level of care (defined as the highest level at
which the cost of a precaution "is less than the expected reduction in harm that it engen-
ders," id. at 3), as "injurers will [still] be protected from part of the risk of losses." SIIAV-
ELL, ECONOMtIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 211-12. In spite of this problem, however, it
remains unnecessary for the government to regulate the sale of liability insurance because
"if liability coverage is forbidden, injurers will be made worse off, as they will be denied
the positive coverage that they would wish to buy .... At the same time, victims would not
be benefited by denying coverage to injurers" as victims "should be indifferent whether or
not injurers purchase coverage and about their level of care, for victims are, by hypothesis,
fully compensated for loss." Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 5.
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monitor their level of care because "full coverage can be provided while
at the same time insureds can be supplied incentives to reduce risks." 2
This observation suggests that insureds should be willing either to pro-
vide information about their level of care to insurers or to pay insurers to
collect such information themselves, for example through regular in-
spections."
3. Summay of the Basic Model
In conclusion, the basic model (with all of its limiting conditions)
suggests that liability insurance is a social good, not only because it al-
lows risk-averse parties to transfer or share some of their risk of liability
without decreasing the deterrent effects of that liability, but also because
it encourages parties to pursue socially beneficial but risky ventures.' In
addition, the model indicates that full coverage is ideal for all irreducible
risks, and for reducible risks if insurers can monitor insureds' level of
care, whereas partial coverage is preferable for reducible risks if insurers
cannot monitor insureds' actions. Finally, the basic model indicates that
if various limiting conditions are met, regulation of liability insurance is
unnecessary because insurers and insureds will reach agreement as to
their preferred level of coverage without regulatory interference, and
victims and taxpayers have no reason to care what level of coverage is
chosen.
C. Complicating Factors
The foregoing description of the Shavell model centered around pe-
cuniary losses in a simplified world in which all accidents were unilat-
eral, risk levels were known, insurers were risk-neutral, injurers were
risk-averse and faced strict liability for their actions, no injurers were
judgment proof, and victims were risk-averse and carried no first-party
insurance. None of these conditions, however, is central to the Shavell
model. The following discussion considers the changes to the model's
prescriptions that result when these conditions are relaxed, and highlights
situations (particularly those relevant to environmental liability) in which
some regulation of the liability insurance market may be socially desir-
able. Much of the following discussion focuses on reducible risks.
5 2 SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5. at 197.
53 d
'Il at 191.
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1. Bilateral Accidents
Consideration of situations in which both the injurer and the victim
can affect the possibility of loss is beyond the scope of this Note. How-
ever, many pollution events are bilateral; victims of pollution are often
employees or third-party contractors exposed to pollutants in the course
of their routine work activity. In these situations, the victim's level of
care clearly affects the probability of an accident. 5
2. Non-Pecuniary Losses
The term "non-pecuniary loss" refers to those losses for which a
victim cannot be made whole by payment of monetary compensation. A
common example of non-pecuniary loss is serious personal injury; few
people would feel adequately compensated for loss of life or a limb by
payment of any sum of money. In the environmental context, extinction
events and damage to unique natural areas are also widely recognized as
involving non-pecuniary losses.56 In addition, environmental catastrophes
may involve some strictly pecuniary losses that must nevertheless be
analyzed as non-pecuniary because of the enormous difficulties involved
in valuing the loss and compensating victims. 7
" See, e.g., Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)
(discussing "pollution-related" injury to a fuel deliveryman that occurred when the victim
accidentally ingested some of the fuel he was delivering to the insured).
56 See, e.g., Charles B. Anderson, Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of Res-
toration, 72 TUL. L. REv. 417, 426 (1997). Anderson observes that:
Many experts in the United States contend that natural resources have value be-
yond their use value. These nonuse values include existence value, which one
commentator has divided into three distinct components: (1) the value of pre-
serving a resource for future use, or "option value"; (2) the value of knowing that
a resource is protected, or "vicarious value"; and (3) the value of preserving a re-
source for future generations, or "intertemporal" value. Another nonuse value is
intrinsic value, the inherent worth of natural objects independent of human use.
Id. Although some of these values are technically pecuniary, in that people would willingly
accept some amount of money as compensation for loss of the value, others (such as worth
independent of human uses) are inherently non-pecuniary.
11 See generally Murray B. Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental Losses: Judg-
ments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 51 (1998) (dis-
cussing various ways of valuing "non-pecuniary environmental losses"); Note, "Ask a SillyV
Question...": Contingent Valuation of Natural Resource Damages, 105 HARv. L. Riv.
1981 (1992) (discussing the use of the "contingent valuation" method to estimate the non-
market values people "derive from publicly owned natural resources"). Suppose, for exam-
ple, a toxic substance leaks into a river, killing all wildlife. The polluter might be able to
compensate all human victims for their direct losses (by paying fishermen for their loss of
livelihood and property owners for their reduction in property value), but it would be ex-
traordinarily difficult to determine how much money was due to neighboring villagers-or
even citizens of other countries-who were simply saddened by the pollution of the river,
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Incorporating such non-pecuniary losses in the Shavell model has an
important effect on analysis of loss events. Potential victims of non-
pecuniary losses are likely to prefer ex ante reduction of risk to ex post-
and necessarily inadequate---compensation, so they have reason to care
about the form of liability insurance purchased by injurers.5 Specifically,
such victims should strongly prefer measures that reduce the likelihood
of loss by inducing insureds to increase their level of care, such as
monitoring by insurers, or inclusion of low ceilings or deductibles in case
of reducible risks.
59
Significantly, though, Shavell argues that even in the presence of
non-monetary losses, it remains unnecessary for regulators "to intervene
with the sale of liability insurance"60 because again, insurers and insureds
will arrive at a system of insurance that optimally preserves the deter-
rence function of legally imposed liability without the aid of regulators.,'
3. Uncertain Risk Levels
The above discussion presumes that risk levels can easily be deter-
mined. Unlike the other presumptions discussed above, this condition
proves central to the conclusions of the basic model. In fact, if this con-
dition is relaxed, insureds no longer have any incentive to purchase the
socially optimal level of insurance. 62
1 See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 9 n.19 (noting that "wxhen
losses are non-monetary, victims generally will not be indifferent about the occurrence of
accidents even though the level of liability is optimal").
-9 Neither monitoring nor reductions in coverage entirely solve the problem posed by
non-pecuniary losses to third-party victims because "if injurers' payments equal only op-
timal compensation" and do not reflect the non-pecuniary components of losses, then "in-
jurers' incentives to take care will be inadequate:' SHAVELL, EcONOMic ANALYSIS, supra
note 5, at 232. The only real solution to this problem is the imposition of fines or other
measures that force an insured to internalize the non-pecuniary effects of her actions. This
Note does not, however, attempt to analyze the effects of changing liability schemes on an
insured's behavioral incentives, but only analyzes various insurance regimes given a par-
ticular level of liability.
60 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 9 n. 19. This conclusion holds even
if a state chooses to impose fines to force injurers to account for some of the non-monetary
losses caused by their actions. That is, "lilt would ordinarily be best for the fines used as a
supplement to liability to be insurable" and insuring against these fines does not reduce
deterrence because as long as insurers can determine insureds' level of care, insurers %%ill
set premiums that reflect both expected losses and expected supplemental fines, and % ill
draft policies that include "provisions inducing [insureds] to take optimal care:" SitAsELL.
EcoNomic ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 211, 233.
61 Of course, if a state chooses a sub-optimal level of liability-for example, by failing
to charge sufficient fines to account for non-monetary losses-it cannot correct that error
by requiring (or proscribing) liability insurance, as the incentives of insurers and insureds
are necessarily capped by the total amount of monetary liability imposed by law.
62 As noted further below, see infra Part V.C, problems of uncertainty are particularly
profound in the environmental context. This immediately suggests that the assumptions of
the Shavell model may not hold true in the environmental context, and, in turn, that the
model may not be a satisfactory tool for analyzing environmental insurance questions.
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As Shavell describes the situation,
Insureds who overestimate risks will tend to buy too much cov-
erage (because premiums will appear low to them), and those
who underestimate risks will buy too little. Similarly, insurers
who underestimate risks will charge too little for coverage so
insureds will tend to buy too much, and those who overestimate
risks will charge too much so insureds will buy too little.6"
And of course, at the extreme, if risks are too hard for insurers to esti-
mate, determination of accurate premiums is impossible, and insurance
may not be sold at all.61
Uncertainty about risk levels may also increase the moral hazard as-
sociated with liability insurance. Specifically, in cases in which insurers
underestimate risk, insureds will purchase too much insurance and will,
in turn, have too little incentive to take care; insurers will not adequately
account for the resulting moral hazard by altering policy terms (because
they have not accurately determined the accurate ex ante expected loss);
and as a result, the purchase of insurance will undermine the intended
deterrent effect of the liability. This result is particularly problematic in
situations that involve non-pecuniary risks, in which victims are not "in-
different about the occurrence of accidents."65
4. Alternative Levels of Risk Aversion
The foregoing discussion assumed that potential injurers were risk-
averse so it is important to ask whether this assumption holds in the envi-
ronmental context. Shavell notes that "[in thinking about the attitudes
toward risk of injurers and of victims," one must "consider the size of
losses in relation to parties' assets,"66 and one should keep in mind four
basic situations: (1) the stereotypical situation in which a large risk-
neutral firm injures a risk-averse individual victim; (2) situations in
63 SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 198.
64 Id. In addition to the basic problem of inability to set accurate premiums when risks
are uncertain, insurers who are unable accurately to estimate the risks facing individual
insureds may also face the problem of "adverse selection." See, e.g., Industrial Economics.
Inc., Improving Access-to-Capital, Site Transition, and Brownfield Redevelopment Pro.
grams Through More Effective Environmental Risk Management, at http://www.epa.gov/
ooaujeag/csi/finalrp5.htm (Feb. 1998) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Re-
view). This problem occurs when only those insureds who know they face an above-
average likelihood of losses purchase policies because "with premiums set based on aver-
age expected losses, the policies are 'underpriced"' for those insureds, but overpriced for
insureds who know they face a below-average likelihood of loss. Id. "To cover the losses to
the increasing number of high-risk policy-holders in the pool, insurers may have to raise
their prices, further discouraging the lower risk policy-holders. This situation can quickly
spiral for insurers, leading to big losses." Id.
6
1 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 9 n.19.
66 SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 207.
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which risk-averse individuals or firms cause losses to less risk-averse
individuals or firms;67 (3) situations in which risk-averse individuals or
firms harm other risk-averse parties; and (4) situations in which large,
relatively risk-neutral firms harm other large firms.68 For purposes of de-
termining the socially optimal level of liability insurance, the key differ-
ence among these various scenarios is the injurer's level of risk aversion.
To apply the Shavell model to the pollution context, therefore, one
must decide which of the above scenarios best describes a "typical" pol-
lution event. One might at first assume that a typical pollution event most
resembles situation (1) above, and therefore that polluters are likely to be
risk-neutral. Actually, though, many pollution events cause "losses that
are high relative to [a firm's] assets yet that are the aggregation of only
relatively modest losses for each victim" '69 Thus, in most circumstances
of interest here, it is more reasonable to presume that potential polluters
are risk-averse (because the potential losses are quite high relative to
their assets), and therefore that they would benefit from transferring or
sharing some of their pollution risk, as in situation (2) or (3) above.",
5. Alternative Levels of Liability
This Note developed Shavell's basic model under the condition that
all injurers faced strict liability for their actions. Such is often the case in
the pollution context, particularly after passage of CERCLA in 1980.21
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider how different forms of liability
affect the conclusions of the Shavell model.
a. No Liability
First, suppose that an injurer faces no liability for her actions.- As
Shavell notes, one of the significant advantages "of the liability system is
67 For example, suppose a single individual illegally deposits a toxic substance at a
large landfill and the toxin ultimately leaks out, creating liability for the landfill operator.6
SlJL
691l at 208.
70 This Note also assumes that insurers are entirely risk-neutral. This assumption sug-
gests that insurers will be willing to assume liability for any known and quantifiable risk.
not that they will be willing to assume liability for all risks. Insurers may also be willing to
assume liability for some uncertain risks as long as the degree of uncertainty is somehow
quantifiable.
7142 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). For a discussion of the implications of CERCLA's
liability regime for environmental liability insurance, see, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham.
Cleaning Up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 601. 623-25
(1993) [hereinafter Abraham, Cleaning Up]; Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liabilitv
and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLu.. L. REV. 942, 957-60 (1988) [hereinafter Abraham.
Limits of Insurance].
7-A no-liability situation could result (1) because there is neither statutory nor com-
mon law liability for the injury in question or (2) because the victims fail to sue their in-
jurer.
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that it provides injurers incentives to reduce risk."73 A zero-liability re-
gime therefore has drawbacks, including the problem that injurers "have
no [financial] motive to take care."'74 This Note does not attempt to pre-
scribe the optimal form of liability, however, but the optimal form of li-
ability insurance in the presence of a particular type of liability, and one
cannot escape the conclusions that in a zero-liability regime, only insur-
ers are made better off by the purchase of liability insurance.
b. Negligence Regime
Next consider the situation of insurers, insureds, victims, and the
public under a negligence rule.75 Whether liability insurance is socially
desirable under a negligence regime depends in part on whether courts
are able accurately to determine both the cost-justified level of care and
the injurer's actual level of care.76 First, assume courts are uniformly able
to determine whether an injurer exercised the optimal level of care and to
impose liability only in those instances in which the injurer's behavior
fell short of this standard. In this situation, injurers have no incentive to
purchase liability insurance for irreducible risks, as they will never be
held liable for losses that result from such risks. Similarly, for reducible
risks, injurers again have no incentive to purchase insurance whether or
not insurers can monitor insureds' level of care because courts will
monitor injurers' level of care for the insurers and will impose liability
only in those situations in which the insurers would deny coverage-
namely, those situations in which the insured exercised less than due
care.77 Thus, under a negligence rule, if there is no "uncertainty over the
determination of negligence," potential injurers will choose not to
purchase insurance, and insurers, in turn, will not offer it.7" Further,
victims and the public will remain indifferent as to whether injurers are
insured in this situation even if the assumption that all losses are
71 SHAVELL, ECONOslIc ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 208. Shavell in fact concludes that
this effect on incentives is "the main advantage of the liability system," at least "where
victims can secure accident insurance coverage" to compensate them for their losses. Id.
Note, however, that individuals may have difficulty obtaining first-party insurance cover-
age for some of the losses associated with pollution events, such as reduction in property
value due to indirect pollution effects.
74 Id.
7- Recall that the point of this analysis is not to determine whether or when a negli-
gence rule is socially optimal, but simply to decide which form of liability insurance is
socially optimal when such a rule is imposed.
76 See generally SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5.
77 Even if an insured were interested in purchasing coverage of losses "produced by
negligent behavior," the premium for this coverage would be "too high to make it worth
purchasing," as insureds would have to pay far more than the ex ante value of their ex-
pected losses to cover the costs of the moral hazard. Id. at 212. "Injurers would therefore
be better off not buying the insurance and taking due care." Id. See also Shavell, Regula-
tion of Insurance, supra note 5, at 6.
71 SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 212.
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pecuniary is relaxed because the negligence rule itself will lead potential
injurers to take the socially optimal level of care."M
If determination of negligence is uncertain, however, "injurers might
be found negligent even if they try to take due care. Thus risk-averse in-
jurers will decide to purchase liability insurance."-,' Importantly, though,
such liability insurance will be carefully structured so as to exclude
losses caused by irreducible risks such as natural disasters, for which
courts are unlikely to hold injurers liable under a negligence rule even in
the presence of uncertainty. Similarly, if insurers cannot monitor in-
sureds' level of care, they will write policies that include low ceilings or
high deductibles either to reduce insureds' moral hazard, as discussed
above for strict liability,' or to "exclude coverage against findings of
negligence that are very likely to have resulted from factors that parties
could control, ... such as, perhaps, a considered corporate policy deci-
sion not to obey a safety regulation. '82 Finally, in this situation, victims
will not be indifferent about the structure of liability insurance even if
losses are purely pecuniary because victims will have no assurance that
they will be compensated, given that injurers who fail to exercise the so-
cially optimal level of care may nevertheless escape liability. Thus, in the
presence of uncertainty about negligence, victims will have a preference
about the structure of liability insurance even for pecuniary losses; they
will prefer policies that offer only partial coverage, or that otherwise
provide insureds with incentives to exercise greater care. Because insur-
ers, too, will prefer such policies, though, no regulation of the market is
necessary.
c. Escape from Liability
Finally, consider the situation of injurers who partially or completely
escape liability (under either a negligence or strict liability regime),
whether because a victim cannot identify the injurer as the cause of the
loss, or because the victim chooses not to sue for other reasons (such as
79 See id. This conclusion still presumes that no injurers are judgment proof.
80Id Shavell observes that there are several reasons why courts may find injurers neg-
ligent "despite [injurers'] intention not to be negligent" Shavell, Regulation of Insurance.
supra note 5, at 7. Courts may simply "err in assessing a party's actual level of care:' they
may focus on a party's momentary rather than prudential level of care, or they may find a
firm liable for the negligence of an employee "despite [the firm's] efforts to prevent em-
ployee negligence.' Id.
8, See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
82 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 7. For similar reasons. in sttua-
tions in which a negligence standard is imposed, courts interpreting ambiguous insurance
policy terms "should attend [to] the degree of control that the insured possessed oser the
behavior giving rise to the type of negligence:' finding for the insurer in cases in %s hich
"the insured enjoyed substantial control over the behavior associated with the type of neg-
ligence," such as when "the insured knowingly purchased a cheap. substandard device to
avoid safety requirements." Id. at 8.
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high litigation costs).,3 In the absence of insurance, this situation results
in inadequate deterrence of harm because injurers make decisions about
their level of care based on their expected liability, which in this circum-
stance falls below the total expected losses caused by their actions.8
This is the first situation yet encountered in which societal regula-
tion of the insurance market could be beneficial. Consider two contrast-
ing possibilities: (1) insurers can monitor insureds' level of care or (2)
insurers cannot monitor that level of care. s"
(I) If insurers can monitor insureds' level of care, then regulation of
the market will not increase insureds' incentives to reduce risk. Forbid-
ding coverage will not be socially beneficial in this situation because
without insurance, injurers will simply choose a suboptimal level of care
that reflects their expected liability rather than the expected losses asso-
ciated with their activities.8 6 Yet requiring full insurance is no more de-
sirable, and is in fact unnecessary. Left to their own devices, insureds in
this situation will themselves choose to purchase full coverage of their
expected liability, 7 but their level of care will remain suboptimal because
insurers will set premiums and draft policy terms based on expected li-
ability rather than expected loss.
(2) If insurers cannot monitor insureds' level of care, however, for-
bidding liability insurance may be socially beneficial, as "any insurance
coverage that injurers purchase will reduce their incentives [to reduce
risk] when insurers do not link premiums to [injurers'] level of care.""
This situation is thus similar to that in the basic model in which insurers
could not monitor insureds' level of care.89 In this case, though, victims
are no longer indifferent to insureds' activity level or level of care be-
83 As discussed below, this situation is quite common in the environmental context.
particularly in the case of exposure to toxic pollutants. Among other problems, such expo-
sure may not immediately cause obvious injury, and by the time an exposure victim falls
ill, causation can be difficult if not impossible to determine and prove. See generally Frank
P. Grad, Remedies for Injuries Caused by Hazardous Waste: The Report and Recomumen-
dations of the Superfund 30](E) Study Group, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10105 (1984).
In the environmental context, injurers may also escape liability because their victims
are unable to establish standing to sue, particularly in cases involving indirect loss. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1992) (holding that to establish
standing to sue under the Endangered Species Act, plaintiffs have "to submit affidavits or
other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that [endangered] species were in
fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that one or more of [plaintiffs'l
members would thereby be 'directly' affected apart from their 'special interest in the sub-
ject"') (internal quotations omitted).
84 See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 7.
8-5 Any actual situation is likely to fall between these two extremes-an insurer is
likely to be able to determine whether an insured's action was deliberate or grossly negli-
gent but may not be able to determine whether the insured's behavior was "optimally"
careful.
,6 See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 11.
17 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
88 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 11.
89 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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cause victims are no longer assured compensation for their losses (since
insureds, by assumption, may escape liability). As a result, partial cover-
age that includes low ceilings or high deductibles-the likely ex ante
choice of both insureds and insurers, as predicted by the basic model-is
no longer sufficient to induce insureds to take adequate care. Thus, in this
circumstance, one might choose to forbid liability coverage entirely to
"ameliorate the problem of inadequate incentives caused by ... escape
from liability. 90
6. Presence of First-Party Insurance
In the above discussions, injurers and their insurers provided the
only source of compensation for victims of loss. Often, though, victims
purchase personal, or first-party, insurance policies that promise compen-
sation in case of personal injury or property damage. In situations in
which victims own policies, "the main advantage of the liability system
is that it provides injurers incentives to reduce risk."91
Importantly, availability of liability insurance does not eliminate this
advantage. As discussed above, if an insurer can monitor the insured's
level of care, the insurer will structure the liability policy to provide ade-
quate incentives for the insured to exercise care. 2 If an insurer cannot
monitor the insured's level of care, the insurer may offer only partial
coverage of the risk, thus reducing the problem of moral hazard." The
primary significance of first-party insurance for this analysis, therefore,
is that (when available) such coverage further obviates the need to con-
sider the taxpayer's and victim's points of view in crafting the ideal li-
ability insurance regime, even in cases in which injurers may be insol-
vent.94
7. Insolvent, or Judgment-Proof, Injurers
The assumption that injurers' assets are sufficient to cover all poten-
tial losses proves key to the various basic conclusions of the Shavell
9 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 12. Even in the absence of an),
coverage, however, injurers will still consider the likelihood that they may escape liability
when making decisions about level of care. Thus, forbidding insurance does not entirely
alleviate the problem of inadequate incentives. In addition, forbidding the purchase of
coverage "lowers the expected utility of injurers by increasing the risk they bear:' UL
91 SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 5, at 208.
9-See supra note 22.
93 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91 Shavell further argues that first-party accident insurance is often a far more efficient
source of compensation to victims than the tort system, particularly given the high costs of
litigating third-party insurance claims. See, e.g., Shavell. Regulation of Insurance. supra
note 5, at 14; Priest, supra note 20, at 499-500 ("[Lloading or administrative costs are
much greater of third-party than of first-party insurance by an estimated magnitude of 2.75
to 5.75 times").
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model discussed above. Relaxing this condition affects many of the pre-
dictions and prescriptions discussed above.
First, consider the choices facing an uninsured potential injurer
whose assets are less than the costs of the harm she may cause. Like the
injurer who escapes liability, this judgment-proof injurer will never face
full liability for the losses she causes. As a result, she will make her de-
cisions about level of care without "tak[ing] into account that part of the
possible loss that victims would have to bear,"95 which will "dilute [her!
incentives to reduce risk. ' 96 In addition, the injurer's judgment-proof
status will reduce her incentive to purchase liability insurance in the first
place since "insuring against liability that one would not otherwise fully
bear, because one's assets would be exhausted, is in a sense a private
waste for a potentially judgment-proof party."' Thus, the judgment-proof
injurer will likely choose "to purchase less than complete coverage, or no
coverage at all," depending on her assets relative to the expected value of
the losses she may cause and her level of risk aversion.9s
Now consider the same situation from the points of view of victims
and taxpayers. If there is a chance that injurers may be judgment proof.
victims are not assured adequate compensation, and (in the absence of
first-party insurance) taxpayers may be forced to bear some portion of
such losses. As a result, if injurers may be judgment proof, victims and
taxpayers have reason to care both about injurers' level of care and about
the availability of first-party or liability coverage.
Clearly, the preferences of judgment-proof injurers differ from those
of their victims (and those of taxpayers, who may bear some of the costs
of the injurers' actions). This scenario is another in which regulation of
the insurance market may benefit society. In this case, however, the opti-
mal form of regulation differs somewhat from that discussed earlier for
injurers who escape liability. Again, consider two possibilities:
(1) insurers can monitor insureds' level of care or (2) insurers cannot
monitor that level of care.
(1) In the case of judgment-proof insurers, unlike that of injurers
who escape liability, if insurers are able to monitor judgment-proof in-
sureds' actions, then mandating full coverage is both beneficial and nec-
essary. Full coverage is beneficial because it will guarantee adequate
compensation for victims of pecuniary losses and will achieve optimal
deterrence (as premiums will be set based on insureds' activity level and
91 Mattias K. Polbom, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 141, 141 (1998).
96 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 10. See also Jeffrey Kehne, En-
couraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for !Iaz-
ardous Waste, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 405 (1986) ("[Ain undercapitalized firm engaged in a
risky activity can be expected to cut corners on safety expenditures with the expectation
that any damages exceeding the firm's net worth will be borne by third parties.").97 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 10.
98 Id.
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level of care), yet such coverage must be mandated because judgment-
proof injurers will never independently choose full coverage (as premi-
ums will reflect some costs of loss that judgment-proof insureds would,
by assumption, othervise avoid paying).Y
(2) By contrast, if insurers are unable to monitor insureds' level of
care, then the situation is similar to that for injurers who escape liability
"forbidding the purchase of coverage will tend to increase incentives to
reduce risk ' 100 In this instance, though, requiring the insured to purchase
coverage that includes a high deductible but no ceiling will also increase
the injurer's incentives to exercise care' 01-and victims of pecuniary
losses in this scenario remain indifferent to the insured's level of care, as
long as the insured's assets are sufficient to cover the deductible. " This
solution has two further advantages over forbidding coverage: forbidding
coverage "lowers the expected utility of injurers by increasing the risk
they bear" and fails to solve the compensation problem posed by judg-
ment-proof injurers, whereas full coverage with a high deductible some-
what reduces the risk born by insureds and entirely solves the compensa-
tion problem.13
These observations suggest that in many cases in which injurers are
judgment proof and insurers cannot monitor insureds' level of care, li-
ability coverage that includes a high deductible (but no ceiling) may pro-
vide sufficient incentives for injurers to take care. Therefore, regulators
should only entirely forbid coverage to potentially judgment-proof injur-
ers in those situations in which the resulting increase in injurers' incen-
9Seeid. at 13.
IO' Id. at 11.
101 By contrast, requiring potential injurers to purchase insurance with a high deducti-
ble does not cure the incentives problem if there is a risk that injurers will escape liability.
because insureds' financial incentives to exercise care cannot exceed their expected liabil-
ity. Shavell seems to ignore this difference between situations in which injurers are judg-
ment proof, and situations in which they escape liability for other reasons. He therefore
concludes that society should forbid insurance in either situation, unless insurers can
monitor insureds' level of care.
"'That is, in this situation, as long as there is no escape from liability, victims of pe-
cuniary losses caused by judgment-proof injurers have no reason to care about the fre-
quency of loss as long as they are guaranteed compensation.
1o3See Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 14. Clearly, if society forbids
insurance, and injurers are insolvent, victims will be inadequately compensated for loss.
Shavell neatly sidesteps this problem by observing that the common "justification ... for
requirements to purchase liability insurance"-that such requirements provide "an implicit
form of insurance protection for victims"-is "mistaken" because usually "it is more ex-
pensive to insure victims via the legal system than directly by first-party insurance cover-
age:' l As noted below, however, this solution is inadequate in some cases of environ-
mental damage, in which it is more efficient (at least with respect to restoration costs) for
an insured to pay the total costs of remediation than for individual victims to collect indi-
vidually for their losses and then attempt collectively to organize a cleanup of the con-
taminated site. See infra Part V.B.
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tives to take care outweighs the twin harms of unwanted risks borne by
injurers and uncompensated losses borne by victims.'"4
Overall, then, Shavell's model suggests that in cases in which injur-
ers may be judgment proof, society should require full coverage if insur-
ers can monitor insureds' actions, but should either forbid liability insur-
ance entirely or require incorporation of high deductibles if insurers can-
not monitor insureds' activity level.
D. Summary of the Assumptions and Conclusions of the Model
As discussed above, the Shavell model incorporates several assump-
tions and leads to a range of basic conclusions. It suggests that in most
situations, no regulation of liability insurance markets is necessary, but
that in situations in which insureds may be judgment proof or may es-
cape liability entirely, some regulation is helpful to ensure that potential
injurers have adequate incentives to exercise care. The model further in-
dicates that the optimal form of regulation in the latter instances depends
on the insurer's ability to monitor the insured's activities. If the insurer
can monitor the insured, regulators should require full coverage, whereas
if the insurer cannot monitor the insured, regulators should forbid cover-
age or require a high deductible.
Having outlined the basic framework of the Shavell model, this Note
now details six recurring, real-world environmental insurance disputes,
all of which involve a version of the widely used CGL insurance policy.
Part IV then applies the Shavell model to each of these disputes and
analyzes the results from the points of view of polluters, liability insur-
ers, pollution victims, and the public. Finally, in Part V, the results of this
analysis are used to critique the model itself, as applied in the environ-
mental context.
III. CGL POLICY ISSUES RELATING TO COVERAGE OF POLLUTION LOSSES
Popular with most business enterprises, CGL policies provide cover-
age of all "sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' . . . which oc-
curs during the policy period" 105 In the early 1970s, with passage of the
federal Clean Air'06 and Clean Water"° Acts and increased public outcry
over environmental pollution, providers of CGL policies began to worry
I'l Note also that if injurers have no assets, forbidding liability coverage (or requiring
a high deductible) will do little to increase their incentives to take care.
,05 See ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 274 (citing the CGL
policy issued by the ISO in 1986).
10642 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994) (enacted in 1970).
,33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (enacted in 1972).
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about their potential exposure to liability for pollution-related losses.'
In response to this concern, the predecessors of the ISO'°0 incorporated a
pollution exclusion clause in the 1973 standard-form CGL policy. The
scope of this clause and its successors, which purport to limit an insurer's
potential liability for personal injuries or property damage caused by
pollution events, has been heavily litigated ever since."n
The form of the pollution exclusion used most frequently by insurers
from 1973 until 1986 provides that the insurance does not apply to losses
resulting from "the discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of certain
types of pollutants unless the discharge is "sudden and accidental. ' "' The
seemingly straightforward language of this "'qualified"' n2 pollution ex-
clusion has proven quite controversial, with parties debating both the
meaning of the exclusion itself and the reach of the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception, which operates to exempt certain unexpected pollution
events from the general pollution exclusion.
Due in part to these controversies, CGL policies issued since 1986
have included a considerably expanded pollution exclusion clause that
contains no exception for "sudden and accidental" events. The debate
over the correct interpretation of the 1973 exclusion remains relevant,
however, as most CGL policies are so-called "long-tail" policies that
cover all claims (whenever filed) resulting from bodily injury or property
damage that occurred "during the policy period.' 3 As a result, interpre-
tation of the qualified exclusion is pertinent to present-day coverage
claims arising out of events that took place between 1973 and 1986."'
'03 See ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 156.
109 The ISO is a service organization whose membership comprises property and casu-
alty insurers. The ISO prepares most standard-form policies used in the industry. These
forms "are designed to provide ... a benchmark for comparison by the more than 1500
insurers in the property/casualty insurance market:' which helps to standardize the indus-
try. 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMEs's APPLEMAN ON INSUItLNCE
§ 2.2.D, at 200 (2d ed. 1996). In turn, standardization better enables purchasers of insur-
ance "to comparison shop for coverage, service and price. Without standardization of cov-
erages, consumers would be inundated with a vast, unintelligible array of different forms
of insurance coverages." Id.
11 See, e.g., Hamel, supra note 1, at 1084; Michelle I. Schaffer, The Evolution of the
Pollution Exclusion: From "Sudden and Accidental" to Absolute and Unambiguous. in
REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: COVER', GE
PROVISIONS, ExCLUSIONS, AND OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 209, 209 (Peter J. Neeson ed..
1995).
"I Id.
12 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3. at 145.
113 Id at 23 (internal quotations omitted); Schaffer, supra note 110, at 28748 (citing
the definitions of "bodily injury" and "property damage" included in the CGL policy is-
sued by the ISO in 1973).
"
4 See Craig R. Brown & Julie B. Pollack. Overvieii' of Environental Coverage Lid-
gation for Comprehensive General Liability Policies, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL lNSLRANCE
COVERAGE CLAIMS AND LITIGATION 7, 19 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course.
Handbook Series No. A-718, 1995).
Because CGL coverage is triggered by occurrences "during the policy period:" CGL
policies are known as "occurrence policies' as distinct from "claims-made policies:' under
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The dispute over interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" exclusion
also continues to be instructive for insurance policy analysts, both be-
cause the controversies led directly to the ISO's expansion of the pollu-
tion exclusion clause in 1986 and because they contributed to insurers'
continuing reluctance to provide coverage for environmental liability. I-'
The meaning and scope of the revised 1986 pollution exclusion
clause are much clearer than those of the qualified exclusion. The most
significant difference between the clauses is that the later version lacks a
"sudden and accidental" exception. As a result, courts have widely inter-
preted the 1986 or "absolute""' 6 exclusion to bar all coverage of environ-
mental claims." 7 In spite of the absolute exclusion's optimistically
definite nickname, however, courts have disagreed over the meaning of
certain terms in the exclusion so "litigation over the ... scope of the [ab-
solute] exclusion [and] ... the meaning of its terms ... [is] likely to
continue for some time before the proper application of the provision
becomes settled.""
8
which coverage is provided "against liability arising out of claims made during the policy
period only." ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 23-24; see also
Hamel, supra note 1, at 1088-89. As Hamel notes, "because the standard CGL policy is an
occurrence-based policy, the pollution exclusion contained in CGL policies written from
1970 through 1986 still has great relevance to today's coverage claims for environmental
damages arising out of occurrences which happened in that decade and a half." Id. In fact,
a quick count of published cases indicates that at least 150 disputes relating to "sudden and
accidental" pollution exclusion clauses have been litigated in a court of record in the last
five years alone. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Apr. 10, 2000) (search for
cases decided after 1995 containing the terms "pollution exclusion" and ("qualified" or
("sudden" within five words of "accidental")), but not "absolute").
As the above quotation and her title suggest, Hamel asserts that the qualified pollution
exclusion was developed in 1970. See id. at 1088. The exclusion was not, however, incor-
porated in the standard-form CGL policy until 1973. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 110, at
209; ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 145.
'is See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICt. L.
REV. 531, 556 n.55 (1996) [hereinafter Abraham, Insurance Policy Interpretation]. In this
recent article, Abraham partially reaffirms his earlier conclusion that courts' narrow read-
ing of the sudden and accidental exclusion "resulted in the insurance industry's revision of
the standard-form policy to remove virtually all pollution coverage from all CGL policies
written beginning in 1986," and further that "insurers seem to have concluded that if they
could not rely on policy provisions that they believed limited coverage ... they would not
insure against pollution liability at all." Id. For a statement of Abraham's earlier, somewhat
more expansive conclusion, see Abraham, Limits of Insurance, supra note 71, at 961-66.
H6 See, e.g., ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 161.
1'7 Hamel, supra note 1, at 1088.
"8 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 162-63.
In addition to new interpretation issues, inclusion of the absolute exclusion in the
standard-form CGL policy has generated another difficult new problem for potential pol-
luters and society. Due to the relative success of the absolute exclusion in limiting insurer
exposure to pollution liability, "[flirms interested in protecting against liability for pollu-
tion must now purchase specialized insurance, which, to the extent it is available at all.
carries high premiums, high deductibles, high coinsurance rates, and low caps." Richard L.
Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECo-
NOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 3, 9 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995)
[hereinafter Revesz & Stewart, The Superfund Debate]. Further, such pollution-specific
insurance is often entirely unavailable so many firms have "little option but to self-instire,
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A full description of the many innovative ways in which both insur-
ers and insureds have parsed CGL policy language during environmental
coverage disputes is beyond the scope of this Note. " ' It is sufficient to
note that the "abundance of federal- and state-court decisions addressing
the pollution-exclusion clause confirms that an enormous outpouring of
judicial energy ... has been expended in attempting to fathom how this
exclusion should be interpreted."20 This Part describes just six interpre-
tive disputes in detail: four closely related disputes regarding the mean-
sometimes risking bankruptcy in the event of an environmental accident:' Id. See also
Randall S. Thomas, The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on Privatization in Central
and Eastern Europe: A Case Studvy of Poland, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 165, 210 (1994)
(noting that specific Environmental Impairment Liability policies that covered gradual
pollution events excluded by CGL policies "'were readily available only until the mid-
1980s. Today they are hard to find, prohibitively expensive, or offer only very limited cov-
erage in the United States.").
Thomas's case study of environmental liabilities in Poland suggests a further interest-
ing consideration relevant to analysis of environmental insurance issues and models. As
Thomas notes, one of "the most serious problems faced by the newly emerging economics
[in Central and Eastern Europe] in privatizing their industrial sectors is financing the
cleanup and disposal of the hazardous wastes generated by these industries during the Cold
War era." Id. at 167. As might be expected, "undefined and potentially escalating environ-
mental liabilities" in these countries "make private investors hesitant to undertake major
investments in privatization projects." Id. at 169. To make matters worse, there is no reason
to expect that the environmental insurance markets in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries will magically evade the "problems that have plagued the American environmental
liability insurance market." Id. at 212. As a result, investors familiar with the troubled
history of the U.S. environmental insurance market-many of whom may already be wary
of investing in emerging economies-may well be further discouraged by concerns over
the cost and continuing availability of environmental insurance.
But see Ann M. Vaeger & Farer Fersko, Current Insurance Products for Insuring
Against Environmental Risks, SE23 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 577 (1999) (discussing the new market
for "liability policies offering protection against specified environmental risks"). These
authors describe the current market for environmental insurance as follows:
While the new environmental insurance coverage being offered today is by no
means a panacea, it may be a device deserving consideration in crafting a solution
[to the environmental insurance crisis] that will enable a particular commercial
transaction to close. Three years ago these types of insurance products were
rarely explored. Now, they are being heavily marketed and the insurance compa-
nies are facing stiff competition, resulting in a substantial reduction in premiums.
It may be that an insurance product that was once prohibitively expensive will
now fit within the financial parameters of a transaction, particularly if a cost-
sharing arrangement can be negotiated between the parties involved.
Id at 616.
119For a more complete summary of the issues relating to interpretation of the
qualified and absolute pollution exclusion clauses, see, e.g., Schaffer supra note 110;
Stevan A. Miller & Julianne L. Swilley, The Absolute Pollution Erclusion in General Li-
ability Insurance Policies, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHIENSIVE GENEL\L
LIABILITY POLICY, supra note 110, at 145.
120 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am.. 629 A.2d 831, 855-65 (NJ.
1993). A cursory survey of published cases suggests that more than 800 disputes relating
to pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies have been litigated since 1970. Search of
WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Mar. 9, 2000) (search for cases containing the terms
"pollution exclusion" and ("general liability" or CGL) in the same paragraph).
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ing of the qualified pollution exclusion, one important controversy per-
taining to the language of the 1973 standard-form CGL policy's coverage
provision itself, and finally, one issue concerning the scope of the abso-
lute exclusion. Part IV then revisits each of these six issues and reconsid-
ers them in light of Shavell's insurance model.
A. The Qualified Pollution Exclusion Clause
"One of the most contested and important issues in the entire field of
environmental liability insurance is the meaning of the [qualified] 'pollu-
tion exclusion' that was ... included in the 1973 revision of the standard-
form CGL policy" and was widely incorporated in CGL policies issued
between 1973 and 1985.2' This qualified exclusion is the only provision
in the 1973 standard-form policy that expressly refers to environmental
liability. Several decades of litigation over the meaning of this provision,
however, have "done little to clarify the scope of coverage for environ-
mental incidents."
1 22
The controversy surrounding the qualified pollution exclusion is
somewhat surprising given the unremarkable language of the clause it-
self. The 1973 standard-form exclusion provides:
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants
or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and acci-
dental.
1 23
The clause thus consists of two parts: a general exclusion of coverage for
losses resulting from most pollution events, followed by an exception
that restores coverage for events in which the pollutant was discharged
suddenly and accidentally. The vast majority of coverage disputes relat-
ing to the qualified pollution exclusion center not on the exclusion itself
but on this exception. 24
Most debates over the meaning and scope of the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception correspond to one or more of the following four ques-
tions: (1) Does the phrase "sudden and accidental"-and, in particular,
121 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 145.
122 Nancy Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatony of the Coin-
prehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion. 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 612 (1990).
12 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 291 (citing the CGL pol-
icy issued by the ISO in 1973).
124 See id. at 145 (introducing the pollution exclusion).
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the term "sudden"--necessarily "possess[ ] a temporal element"?'2
(2) Which event must be "sudden and accidental:' the discharge itself or
the resulting loss? 26 (3) Assuming the discharge itself must be "sudden
and accidental" to qualify for the exception, which discharge is relevant,
the initial disposal of a pollutant or the subsequent leakage of the pollut-
ant from the disposal site? 27 (4) And finally, again assuming the dis-
charge itself must be "sudden and accidental:' whose point of view is
relevant to this determination, that of the polluter or that of some third
party (such as a predecessor in interest, a third-party contractor, or even a
vandal)?'2 Courts at all levels have given widely divergent answers to
each of these questions.
1. Does the "Sudden and Accidental" Exception Include a
Temporal Element?
The broadest and most contentious question relating to the "sudden
and accidental" exception is the precise meaning of the phrase "sudden
and accidental:' and particularly the term "sudden:' As might be ex-
pected, insurers typically argue that an event must occur abruptly and be
short-lived-a "so-called 'boom' event"-for coverage to be restored
under the "sudden and accidental" exception."-' By contrast, insureds in-
sist that "sudden and accidental" implies merely an unintended and un-
expected event, and that coverage should be available for any pollution
event about which the insured was unaware, regardless of the duration of
the event or the abruptness of its onset. -0
'25Morton, 629 A.2d at 847; see generally Schaffer, supra note 110, at 212-20;
Hamel, supra note 1, at 1092-98; Ballard & Manus, supra note 122, at 613-20; E. David
Hoskins, Striking a Balance: A Proposal for Interpreting the Pollution E clusion Clause in
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies, 19 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,351 (1989.
126 See, e.g., ABRAHAMs, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 147-48; Hamel,
supra note 1, at 1099.
"-7 See, e.g., Hamel, supra note 1, at 1099-1100.
"' See, e.g., id. at 1100-01; Morton, 629 A.2d at 848.
2' Morton, 629 A.2d at 852. See also id. at 856-70 (surveying the federal and state
case law on both sides of the debate over the meaning of the term "sudden").
130 See id. at 856-70.
One can make a strong argument that the ISO did not originally intend for the sudden
and accidental exception to be limited to pollution events of short duration. See. e.g..
Broadwell Realty Servs. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y, 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987) (noting that "[tihere is substantial authority supporting the thesis that the
pollution exclusion was intended to be coextensive with the scope of the definition of oc-
currence" in the CGL policy). That is, when it was first drafted, the exception may have
been intended to apply generally to unexpected pollution events, not solely to unexpected
and rapid events. Among other evidence for this proposition, a predecessor of the ISO
initially explained the 1973 pollution exclusion as a clarification rather than an alteration
of the then-existing CGL coverage situation, with the result that "[]overage is continued
for pollution or contamination caused injuries where the pollution or contamination results
from an accident," but is precluded in situations in which "the damages can be said to be
expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence:* hL at 85 n. 1.
This evidence of the insurance industry's original intent in drafting the "sudden and
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Judicial responses to this issue vary widely. Some courts rely on fa-
miliar interpretations of the phrase "sudden and accidental" in other in-
surance contexts to hold that the term "sudden" has "no temporal mean-
ing in this setting" and therefore a "sudden and accidental" event means
simply an "unexpected" event. 3 ' Many other courts invoke dictionary
definitions of "sudden," as well as an anti-redundancy canon of interpre-
tation, to find that when the term "sudden" is used in conjunction with
"accidental" it must have some meaning other than "unexpected," and
therefore a "sudden and accidental" event must be not only "unexpected"
but also abrupt,'32 or perhaps even brief. 33 Finally, some courts take note
of these conflicting interpretations and choose not to resolve the meaning
of the term "sudden" at all, but to rule in favor of the insured on the
grounds that the policy term is ambiguous. 34
accidental" exception has convinced at least one formerly skeptical commentator. Abraham
"once argued" that activist judges who ruled in favor of insureds on questions relating to
the scope of the "sudden and accidental" exception had driven the insurance industry to
revise the pollution exclusion in 1986 and remove the "sudden and accidental" exception.
Recently, however, Abraham concluded (in part based on "the representations that the
insurance industry made to state insurance commissioners when it sought approval of the
exclusion in the early 1970s") that "proper interpretation of the pre-1986 pollution exclu-
sion is a more complicated question." Abraham, Insurance Policy Interpretation, supra
note 115, at 556 n.55.
This Note, however, disregards estoppel arguments for interpreting the "sudden and
accidental" exception in favor of insureds. Instead, the Note considers the exception only
in terms of the Shavell model.
"I' See ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3. at 148, 148 n.34 (citing
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990)).
132See id. at 148, 148 n.35 (citing Powers Chemco Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d
1301 (1989) and United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th
Cir. 1988)); Barbara Hopkinson Kelly & Colin P. Hackett, Trends and Emerging Coverage
Issues, in I ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE COVERAGE CLAIMIS AND LITIGATION, supra note
114, at 99, 111; Morton, 629 A.2d at 847.
The court in Morton felt that the term "sudden" necessarily included a temporal ele-
ment, but it nevertheless chose not to require that the event be of short duration.
Although the word "sudden" is hardly susceptible of precise definition, and is
undefined in those CGL policies that include the standard pollution-exclusion
clause, we are persuaded that 'sudden' possesses a temporal element, generally
connoting an event that begins abruptly or without prior notice or warning, but the
duration of the event-whether it lasts an instant, a week, or a month-is not nec-
essarily relevant to whether the inception of the event is sudden.
Id.
I33 See Hoskins, supra note 125, at 10,351 (In "a string of victories for insurance coin-
panies" beginning in 1984, many courts held that "the term 'sudden and accidental' in the
pollution exclusion clause only restores coverage for pollution that is virtually instantane-
ous").
,34 See ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 148, 148 n.34 (citing
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 570). The doctrine that ambiguous contract language should be inter-
preted against the drafter-here, the insurance company-is known as "contra proferen-
tem" and is often "'more rigorously applied in insurance than in other contracts, in recog-
nition of the difference between the parties in their acquaintance with the subject matter."'
Id. at 28 n.55 (citing Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.
1947) (Learned Hand, J.)).
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This judicial disagreement over whether the "sudden and accidental"
exception imposes a requirement that pollution events be short-lived or
abrupt, or simply unexpected, suggests that the outcome in litigation in-
volving a slow and prolonged, yet unexpected pollution event (that oc-
curred, in part, between 1973 and 1986) depends largely on choice of
law. That is, in a case involving a qualified pollution exclusion, whether a
plaintiff facing significant liability for losses and environmental cleanup
after a protracted pollution event 35 receives insurance coverage depends
less on the plaintiff's actions, the policy language, or the ex ante intent of
the parties, than on which state's insurance law applies.
2. What Must Be "Sudden and Accidental," the Discharge or the
Resulting Loss?
If one interprets the "sudden and accidental" exception to mean, at
least, unexpected and unintended, a second, closely related question
arises: which event must be "sudden and accidental" to qualify for cover-
age, the polluter's discharge or the resulting personal injury or property
damage? The policy language relevant to this question seems quite clear:
losses are covered as long as the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental."' 6 Nevertheless, some courts rely on certain
insurance industry representations to states' insurance commissioners
during the process of drafting the pollution exclusion to conclude that "at
the time the exclusion was introduced," it was "intended merely to
confirm" certain limitations in the coverage provision of the CGL policy
that limit coverage to "bodily injury and property damage that is 'neither
expected nor intended.""' 37 Accordingly, these courts interpret the pollu-
tion exclusion to exclude coverage only for pollution events in which the
resulting loss is intentional; all unexpected losses-including those re-
sulting from intentional, long-term disposal of pollutants-are therefore
covered.
To clarify the distinctions at issue here and in question (1) above, it
is helpful to consider the facts of a particular case in which a polluter
facing cleanup liability sought coverage from its insurer. In Morton In-
135 Suppose, for example, a landfill or buried oil or gas tank slowly leaks over a period
of years, eventually contaminating groundwater sources.
136 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3. at 291 (citing the CGL pol-
icy issued by the ISO in 1973).
137 Abraham, Cleaning Up, supra note 71, at 624-25 (citing Joy Techs.. Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W.Va. 1992)); see also Hoskins. supra note 125. at 10.351
(citing City of Northglenn v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 tD. Colo. 1986). in
which the court found the conflict between the policy's trigger provision (which allowed
coverage for unexpected damages) and the "sudden and accidental" exception (which lim-
ited coverage to unexpected discharges) to be ambiguous, and therefore interpreted the
policy in favor of the insured).
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ternational, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America,"8 the
plaintiff faced liability (inherited from its corporate predecessor) for the
costs "involved in remediating pollution of Berry's Creek, an estuary of
the Hackensack River, that had been caused by discharges from a mer-
cury-processing plant operated for over forty-years."'3 The court de-
scribed the devastating results of this pollution as follows:
Beneath its surface, the tract is saturated by an estimated 268
tons of toxic waste, primarily mercury. For a stretch of several
thousand feet, the concentration of mercury in Berry's Creek is
the highest found in fresh water sediments in the world. The
waters of the creek are contaminated by the compound methyl
mercury, which continues to be released as the mercury interacts
with other elements. Due to depleted oxygen levels, fish no
longer inhabit Berry's Creek, but are present only when swept in
by the tide and, thus, irreversibly toxified.
40
Given the almost half-century of discharges at issue in Morton, the
plaintiff clearly could not aver that the pollution event was abrupt or
short-lived. Nor could the plaintiff insist that its predecessor's actions
constituted "unexpected" discharges. Instead, the plaintiff argued that its
insurance policies did not bar coverage for the cleanup costs because "no
intent 'to pollute the waters of the State' had been proved. ' 14I That is, the
plaintiff argued that the resulting pollution was unexpected and unin-
tended and thus excepted from the qualified pollution exclusion clauses
contained in several of its insurance policies.
4 1
Ultimately, the Morton court took an intermediate position in inter-
preting the "sudden and accidental" exception, choosing to apply the
clause to the discharges rather than the resulting losses, but to overlook
the temporal aspects of the term "sudden."'' 43 Essentially on grounds of
estoppel, the court decided only to enforce the pollution exclusion "to the
extent of precluding coverage for an insured's intentional discharge of
known pollutants."'" Nevertheless, the court found in favor of those in-
surers whose policies included pollution exclusion clauses because the
38 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993).
139 Id. at 834.
140 Id. (citing the same court's earlier opinion in N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron
Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 150 (N.J. 1983)).
141 Id. at 835.
142 See id.
143 Morton, 629 A.2d at 880.
114 Id. The Morton court reached this verdict in spite of its determination that the term
"sudden" possesses a temporal element because it found that construing the term in a way
that favored insurers would "violate this State's strong public policy requiring regulation of
the insurance business in the public interest, and would reward the industry for its misrep-
resentation and nondisclosure to state regulatory authorities" at the time the qualified pol-
lution exclusion was first introduced. Id. at 871-73.
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court felt that the "conclusion [was] unavoidable that [the plaintiff's]
predecessors had intentiotzally discharged known pollutants over a long
and continuing period.'
4-
One commentator summarized the confusing state of the law exem-
plified by the Morton decision as follows:
[I]n some states the pollution exclusion precludes coverage of
liability for harm caused by gradual pollution; in some states the
exclusion does not preclude coverage of liability for harm
caused by gradual pollution if the discharge of the pollutant was
unexpected and unintended ("sudden and accidental"); and in
some states the exclusion does not preclude coverage of liability
for harm caused by gradual pollution, even if the discharge of
the pollutant was expected or intended, if the harm caused by
the discharge was not expected or intended.'-
Only Lewis Carroll could have devised a more convoluted coverage
scheme. 47
3. Which Discharge Is Relevant, Initial Disposal or
Subsequent Leakage?
Unfortunately, resolution of questions (1) and (2) above is not the
end of the matter. Regardless of how courts rule on the meaning of the
"sudden and accidental" exception, if they apply the exception to the in-
sured's discharge rather than the resulting damage, they must then con-
sider a further question: which discharge must be unexpected to qualify
for coverage, the polluter's initial disposal of the pollutant or the subse-
quent leakage of the pollutant from the disposal area into the environ-
ment?148 This dispute is relevant in many familiar circumstances in which
the initial placement or disposal is intentional-for example, the insured
may deliberately bury fuel storage tanks under her gas station or dispose
of waste at a landfill-but the subsequent release of the pollutant into the
broader environment occurs unexpectedly.
On this question, insureds frequently argue that the relevant release
is not the original disposal of wastes but the subsequent leakage of the
wastes from the disposal site.'49 To support this "secondary discharge
145 Id at 880.
146 Abraham, Cleaning Up, supra note 71. at 625.
'47 "'Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, 'if it was so, it might be: and if it %vere so,
it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic."' LEWIS CARROLL. TtRnouG1 rnIL LoOKi-
ING GLASS 52 (1946), quoted in Thomas C. Gilchrist, Insurance Coverage for PollutiOn
Liability in the United States and the United Kingdom: Covering Troubled llaters. 23 C %sE
NV. REs. J. INT'L L. 109, 109 (1991).
48See, e.g., Hamel, supra note I, at 1099-1100.
149 Kelly & Hackett, supra note 132, at 112.
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argument," insureds claim "that the dictionary definition of the terms
'discharge, dispersal, release or escape' requires that there be a liberation
from containment and ... this does not occur until the substances leach
into the environment."' 50 Insurers commonly respond by observing that a
reasonable interpretation of the phrase "discharge ... into or upon land"
in the pollution exclusion clause 5' encompasses intentional discharge of
a pollutant into a landfill or holding pond. 152
As might be anticipated in light of the extensive judicial disagree-
ment over questions (1) and (2) above, resolution of the secondary dis-
charge argument also depends on choice of law. In the majority of juris-
dictions, the qualified pollution exclusion clause proscribes coverage of
losses resulting from intentional disposal of pollutants,'53 but in some
jurisdictions, losses resulting from intentional disposal followed by un-
foreseen leakage are covered under the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion."54
4. "Sudden and Accidental" from Whose Point of View?
A final significant question that arises in those jurisdictions in which
the "sudden and accidental" exception encompasses unexpected and un-
intended pollution events is whose point of view should be considered in
determining whether a discharge was unexpected. True to form, courts
disagree on this question, and in this instance, the terms of the qualified
exclusion offer little guidance.
Due to the lack of relevant language in the qualified pollution exclu-
sion itself, at least one court has relied on the language of the CGL pol-
icy's coverage provision, which explicitly refers to "bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured,"' 55 to hold that knowledge or intent on the part of a third party
does not preclude coverage of a pollution event. 56 This court thus
granted coverage of losses resulting from an oil spill caused by vandals
who intentionally "opened an above-ground oil storage tank valve, al-
150 Id.
151 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 291 (citing the CGL
Policy issued by the ISO in 1973).
152 See, e.g., Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 607
(10th Cir. 1992) (finding that the district court's order that the pollution exclusion clause
applied only to secondary discharge of chemicals into groundwater was reversible error).
53 See, e.g., id.
'1 See Kelly & Hackett, supra note 132, at 113-19 (surveying cases in which courts
have considered the secondary discharge argument and reached varying conclusions);
Brown & Pollack, supra note 114, at 25-26; Hamel, supra note 1, at 1099.
155 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 291 (citing the definition
of "occurrence" included in the CGL policy issued by the ISO in 1973).
156 See Ballard & Manus, supra note 122, at 634 (discussing Lansco Inc. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1976)).
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lowing 14,000 gallons of oil to flow" onto the insured's property and into
a nearby river because the insured neither expected nor intended the re-
lease. -
7
Other courts, by contrast, side with insurers in the debate over point
of view, finding that "an insured's protection [can] be eliminated by the
intentional activities of an unrelated third party." 1  Thus, in one case, a
state supreme court affirmed an appeals court ruling that hazardous mate-
rials that had been buried on the insured's land "'years earlier by a former
landowner" did not constitute "sudden and accidental" discharges within
the meaning of the qualified pollution exclusion because "the former
owner had intended to bury the waste on the property."'"' The state ap-
peals court explained that in its view, "[tihe relevant factor is not whether
the policyholders anticipated or intended the resultant injury or damage,
but whether the toxic material was discharged into the environment un-
expectedly and unintentionally or knowingly and intentionally.'W
Confusion surrounding the 1973 qualified pollution exclusion is
therefore complete. The meaning of the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion is indeterminate; it is unclear to which set of events the phrase
should be applied; and finally, there is no consensus as to whether the
exception sets out a subjective or an objective standard.
B. The "As Damages" Issue
The above discussion may leave the impression that, to receive in-
surance coverage for a pollution event under a 1973 CGL policy, one
need only convince a court that the event falls outside the policy's pollu-
tion exclusion. In fact, several other aspects of standard-form CGL poli-
cies also limit coverage of expenses related to pollution events. For ex-
ample, to qualify for coverage under the 1973 policy, insureds must be
"legally obligated to pay" the expenses in question; the expenses must be
payable "as damages"; the expenses must result from "bodily injury" or
"property damage"; and the injury or damage must "be caused by an 'oc-
currence."'Il Discussion of the extensive controversy surrounding each
15 Id.
1511M. at 641.
'59Ld2 (discussing Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 144 A.D.2d 445 N.Y. App.
Div. 1988) aff'd, 548 N.E.2d 1301 (1989)). See also Hamel, supra note 1, at 1101 n.100
(citing Powers Chemco as an example of an instance in which the pollution exclusion
clause was held to "preclude coverage for intentional conduct of an insured's predecessor
in interest").
160 Powers Cheinco, 144 A.D.2d at 447 (internal citations omitted).
1
61 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3. at 44. 50. 72. 91. Abraham
provides an extensive discussion of these and other issues relating to interpretation of the
CGL policy in the pollution context. See generally id. at 43-194.
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of these issues is not relevant here, but brief consideration of the "as
damages" issue is informative. 62
In the absence of claims of bodily injury, the 1973 standard-form
CGL policy requires that expenses be payable "as damages ... because
of . . . 'property damage"' to qualify for coverage. 63 The central issue
that arises in interpreting this requirement relates to the question of envi-
ronmental cleanup costs. As Abraham notes, common law tort liability
does not usually encompass environmental cleanup costs; instead, such
costs normally arise under a federal or state statutory regime such as that
imposed by CERCLA.'1 "Consequently, whether cleanup costs constitute
'damages"' within the meaning of the 1973 CGL policy "must be deter-
mined by comparing the nature of the liabilities and obligations that
these statutory regimes create with the meaning of the term 'damages' in
the ... policy."'65
Both federal and state courts disagree about the outcome of this
comparison. Many federal district and circuit courts, as well as at least
one state supreme court, agree with insurers that equitable environmental
remedies mandated by statute or compelled by court order do not consti-
tute "damages" under the CGL policy. The Eighth Circuit, for instance,
evaluated the meaning of the term "damages" as it is understood in the
insurance industry and concluded that although the term is "ambiguous"
if "[v]iewed outside the insurance context," within that context, "the term
... is not ambiguous, and the plain meaning ... refers to legal damages
and does not include equitable monetary relief."' 66
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed in Morton, however,
"the clear weight of authority ... among both federal and state courts
adopts the view that the undefined term 'damages' in CGL policies
should be accorded its plain non-technical meaning, . . . encompassing
response costs imposed to remediate environmental damages."' 67 To ex-
plain its reasoning, the court cited with approval an argument made by
the Washington Supreme Court in a similar situation involving contami-
nation of groundwater:
162 The "as damages" issue is chosen for analysis not only because it is an "area of
enormous controversy," id. at 50, but also because it squarely raises the question of the
relative costs and benefits of covering environmental cleanup costs under comprehensive
general liability insurance (rather than, for instance, pollution-specific liability insurance),
1
63 Id. at 291 (citing the CGL policy issued by the ISO in 1973).
164 See id. at 50.
165 Id.
166 Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (applying Missouri law). This court was also quite concerned about the
moral hazard that could arise in situations in which cleanup costs imposed on the insured
exceeded the value of the insured property. See id. at 986-87. For further discussion of the
relationship between the "as damages" debate and moral hazard, see infra Part IV.B.
167 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 845 (N.J. 1993),
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If the state were to sue in court to recover in traditional "dam-
ages," including the state's costs incurred in cleaning up the
contamination, for the injury to the groundwater, [the insurer's]
obligation to defend against the lawsuit and to pay damages
would be clear. It is merely fortuitous from the standpoint of
either [the insured] or [the insurer] that the state has chosen to
have [the insured] remedy the contamination problem, rather
than choosing to incur the costs of clean-up itself and then suing
[the insured] to recover those costs. The damage to the natural
resources is simply measured in the cost to restore the water to
its original state.169
In light of this argument, the Morton court chose to apply a broad
definition of "damages" that encompasses environmental response costs
and remediation expenses.
69
As this debate demonstrates, clearing the hurdles posed by the
qualified pollution exclusion is only half the battle for insureds seeking
compensation for costs associated with environmental liability. The lan-
guage of the 1973 CGL policy's coverage provision may also impede
recovery of environmental cleanup costs in many jurisdictions.
C. The Absolute Pollution Exclusion Clause
The final, real-world insurance dispute considered here relates to the
"absolute" pollution exclusion adopted by the ISO in 1986 in response
both to the profusion of "inconsistent judicial interpretations"'s" of the
qualified pollution exclusion and to insurer concern over the 1980 enact-
ment of CERCLA. m' The degree of detail in the new exclusion evidences
the ISO's hope that this revision would effect "a major expansion in the
scope of the pollution exclusion."' 72 The 1986 exclusion provides:
This insurance does not apply to ...
16kld. at 846 (quoting Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 784 P.2d 507. 511-12
(Wash. 1990)). See also ABRAHAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 64
("Suppose that a pollutant discharged by a CGL policyholder contaminates neighboring
property. The owner of that property ... takes steps to remedy the contamination and later
sues the policyholder .... In that situation there is a strong argument that any liability
imposed on the insured is for 'damages."')
169 See 629 A.2d at 846-47.
170 Miller & Swilley, supra note 119, at 145.
171 Insurer concern stemmed largely from CERCLAs imposition of strict. retroactive.
and joint and several liability for cleanup on parties responsible for contaminating hazard-
ous waste sites. See, e.g., ISO, supra note 4; Abraham. Cleaning Up. supra note 71. at
602-07; Abraham, Limits of Insurance, supra note 71. at 957-60.172
ABRAHAI i, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE. supra note 3. at 160-61.
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(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or es-
cape of pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or others
for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of
waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated,
disposed of, or processed as waste by or for you or any person
or organization for whom you may be legally responsible, or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or any con-
tractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are per-
forming operations...
(2) [Or to a]ny loss, cost, or expense, arising out of any gov-
ernmental direction or request that you test for, monitor, clean
up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned or reclaimed. 173
Most insurers now include in general liability policies either this seem-
ingly "absolute" pollution exclusion or a similarly worded version that
"contemplate[s] the elimination of coverage for most pollution-related
claims."'74
The comprehensiveness of the absolute pollution exclusion almost
defies belief. In particular, by eliminating the "sudden and accidental"
exception, the ISO eliminated all of the interpretation issues discussed
earlier, including all questions of "'fault, responsibility or causation on
171 Id. at 274-75 (citing the CGL policy issued by the ISO in 1986). The ISO revised
this language again in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1998, "each time apparently attempting
to narrow coverage." William J. Mitchell, CGL Pollution Exclusion Provisions and the Sick
Building Syndrome: Despite Valiant Rewriting Efforts, Pollution Exclusions, Absolute or
Not, Do Not Always Preclude Liability for a Variety of Ills, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 124, 130
(1999) (mentioning the 1990, 1993 and 1996 revisions); see also Schaffer, supra note 110.
at 226 (noting the 1988 revision); Barney J. Mason, New in the Law: Is the 'Absolute'Pol-
lution Exclusion Really Absolute? Time Will Tell, (last visited Dec. 1, 2000). at http://www.
cusack-knowles.comlexclusion.htm (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review)
(noting the 1998 revision).
Significant parts of the 1986 absolute pollution exclusion, and in particular the
definition of "pollutants" cited here, remain unaltered in subsequent versions of the exclu-
sion. See Mason, supra (citing the 1996 pollution exclusion, including the definition of
pollutants, and noting that the 1996 language is "not materially different from the 1998
revision").
114 Schaffer, supra note 110, at 225.
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the part of or by the insured. Coverage is excluded for all pollution
claims no matter how caused.""' 5 Further, the absolute exclusion clearly
eliminates coverage for cleanup liability imposed on the insured by
CERCLA or any other pollution statute. Nevertheless, the revised pollu-
tion exclusion is not as absolute as the insurance industry no doubt
hoped.'76 Several terms remain ambiguous, including the all-important
terms "discharge, dispersal, release or escape," and "pollutants."'"
The most interesting current controversy over the meaning of these
terms involves circumstances in which an individual is injured by expo-
sure to a toxic substance in a non-environmental setting. Clearly, most
circumstances in which a known pollutant discharged into the environ-
ment results in injury to exposed individuals fall squarely under the ab-
solute exclusion. When an individual is injured in a more routine expo-
sure to a toxic substance, however, some courts find that the resulting
losses fall outside the scope of the exclusion 76
Courts' rationales for granting coverage in some instances for per-
sonal injuries that result from routine exposure to toxic substances fall
into two general categories. First, in some instances, courts rely on the
sheer breadth of the absolute exclusion's definition of "pollutants" to rea-
son that some "limiting principle" is necessary to constrain application of
the clause.179 Thus, in a case involving an employee who was exposed to
hazardous fumes discharged by a third-party contractor hired to repair
1
75 Id. at 227-28 (citing Vantage Dev. Corp. v. Am. Env't Techs. Corp.. 598 A.2d 948.
954 (N.J. Super. 1991)).
176 A survey of published federal and state court cases indicates that about 260 disputes
relating to the absolute pollution exclusion have been filed since 1986. Search of WESTL3,V.
Allcases Database (Apr. 15, 2000) (search for all cases containing the term "absolute pol-
lution exclusion").
77 See, e.g., Nautilus Ins. Co. v Jabar, 188 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1999) (ruling in favor of
the insured on the grounds that the pollution exclusion in the relevant insurance policy was
ambiguous); ABRAHt, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 162 (discussing
some of the issues that have arisen in application of the absolute pollution exclusion).
'
79 For a general discussion of various cases granting or denying coverage under the
absolute exclusion, see Kelly & Hackett, supra note 132, at 104-10.
79 Nautilus Ins. Co, 188 E3d at 30-31 (internal citations omitted) (listing a variety of
cases in which the absolute exclusion's definition of pollutant was held to be ambiguous).
As the Nautilus court notes, id. at 31, the Seventh Circuit has also discussed the issue of
ambiguity in the absolute exclusion's definition of pollutant:
Without some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend far
beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results. To take but two sim-
ple examples, reading the clause broadly would bar coverage for bodily injuries
suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Drano,
and for bodily injury caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool.
Although Drano and chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that cause, under
certain conditions, bodily injury or property damage, one would not ordinarily
characterize these events as pollution.
Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 t7th Cir.
1993).
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the employer's roof, the court held that the absolute exclusion in the
contractor's insurance policy was "ambiguous as a matter of law as ap-
plied to [the employee's] claim."'80 The court accordingly "restrict[ed]
the exclusion's scope to only those hazards traditionally associated with
environmental pollution" and denied the insurer's request for summary
judgment barring liability coverage.' Similarly, the Washington State
Court of Appeals found the absolute exclusion inapplicable to the case of
a deliveryman who was injured when he was doused with diesel fuel
while delivering the fuel to the insured. 2 Because the court felt "the
pollution exclusion could be construed [either] to limit claims only for
traditional environmental damages" or to "preclud[e] the type of claim
presented here," it deemed the clause "ambiguous" and ruled in favor of
the insured.'83
The second reason some courts disregard the absolute pollution ex-
clusion in cases of bodily injury resulting from routine exposure to toxic
substances is that "the terms used in the exclusion clause, such as 'dis-
charge,' 'dispersal,' 'release' and 'escape,' are terms of art in environ-
mental law and are generally used to refer to damage or injury resulting
from environmental pollution."'" Courts following this line of reasoning
argue that a reasonable insured "would understand this provision to ex-
clude coverage only for injuries caused by traditional environmental
pollution."'85 That is, an insured operating a business that did not pose a
traditional pollution risk might reasonably assume her insurance policy
covered the routine use of the various chemicals necessary for her busi-
ness operations. 8 6 As a result, because "'an ordinary person in the shoes
of an insured would not understand that the policy did not cover claims
such as those brought,"' these courts find the absolute pollution exclusion
to be ambiguous and find for the insured. 87
The many cases in which courts find the absolute pollution exclusion
to be clear and unambiguous far outnumber the few in which courts
choose to constrain the meaning and scope of the exclusion and to grant
coverage for the insured. 88 Nevertheless, the burgeoning controversy
180 Nautilus Ins. Co, 188 F.3d at 31.
181 Id.
182 See Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
83 Id. at 112.
1' Nautilus Ins. Co., 188 F.3d at 30.
185Id.
19 See id. In support of its ruling, the Nautilus court quoted NV. Am. Ins. Co. v. Tufco
Flooring E., Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692, 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), in which the court held that
"'[t]o allow West American to deny coverage for claims arising out of Tufco's central
business activity would render the policy virtually useless to Tufco."' Nautilus Ins. Co.,
188 F.3d at 30.
18 Nautilus Ins. Co., 188 F.3d at 30 (quoting Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d
383 (Me. 1989)).
', See, e.g., Brown & Pollack, supra note 114, at 28 ("[Mlost courts reviewing the is-
sue have held that the absolute pollution exclusions [sic] bars coverage for all damage
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over the application of the absolute exclusion to personal injuries that
result from routine exposure to "pollutants" suggests that the insurance
industry has not yet succeeded in entirely eliminating its exposure to li-
ability for some pollution losses.
IV. APPLICATION OF SHAVELL'S INSURANCE MODEL TO THE
CGL INTERPRETATION DISPUTES
This Part uses Shavell's liability insurance model to analyze the
CGL policy interpretation disputes outlined in Part III. Note that the re-
sults of this analysis are not intended as recommendations to courts ad-
dressing these disputes; fair resolution of any individual coverage con-
troversy obviously requires application of familiar doctrines of contract
interpretation, and this Note largely disregards such doctrines. Consid-
eration of the general CGL pollution exclusion disputes in light of the
Shavell model, however, serves to elucidate some of the broader implica-
tions of these disputes for insurers, insureds, victims, and the public and
suggests some potential shortcomings of the model itself as applied to
environmental insurance disputes.
A. The Qualified Pollution Exclusion
1. Does the "Sudden and Accidental" Exception Include a
Temporal Element?
As discussed above, the language of the "sudden and accidental" ex-
ception to the 1973 pollution exclusion is highly ambiguous. Among
other disputes, insurers argue that the exception restores coverage only
for those events that are both unexpected ("accidental") and abrupt or
rapid ("sudden"), whereas insureds aver that the exception restores cov-
erage for all unexpected pollution events, even if they do not occur
abruptly or rapidly. Courts have failed to reach a consensus on the ques-
tion.
18 9
Applying the Shavell model to this question suggests that all parties
would be better off if the CGL policy had originally been drafted explic-
itly to exclude pollution events that are either expected or gradual. To see
this, consider the following three scenarios, each of which involves a gas
station (the insured) that buries a large gasoline tank under its gas
pumps:
90
resulting from the discharge or release of hazardous substances:'); Kelly & Hackett, supra
note 132, at 103 ("The exclusion has been held to bar coverage by most courts, if not all,
throughout the United States for claims arising out of environmental contamination or
pollution.").
19 See, e.g., Hamel, supra note 1.
190 These examples are slightly out of date, as new technologies and safety regulations
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Scenario A-an unexpected, gradual, and long-lived event: The tank
rusts and then leaks over a period of years, eventually contaminating the
groundwater in the area.
Scenario B-an unexpected, abrupt, and long-lived event: The tank
is damaged abruptly (for example, by minor construction activity in the
vicinity of the gas station) and then leaks over a period of years, eventu-
ally contaminating the groundwater in the area.
Scenario C-a "boom" event: A fire at the gas station causes the
tank to explode, releasing gasoline that contaminates a nearby lake.
These events have several important similarities. First, all three sce-
narios involve some reducible risks because the insured could have less-
ened the likelihood of the leakage event in each scenario.'"' For example,
in all three scenarios, the gas station could have installed a more durable
gas tank. Similarly, in Scenario B, the gas station could have supervised
more closely the nearby construction activity to be sure that no heavy
machinery damaged the gas tank. Finally, in Scenario C, the station could
have implemented strict fire safety precautions.
In addition to the reducible nature of many of the risks involved in
each scenario, other similarities include each gas station's assets and its
(and its victims') likely level of risk aversion. These traits are not likely
to depend on the precise cause of the pollution event. Further, all three
scenarios involve comparable accidents and losses. Finally, due to the
similarity of accident type and scope, the same liability regime may well
govern in each case.
9 2
In spite of these similarities, however, the scenarios differ in two
significant ways. First, Scenario C involves risks that are readily moni-
tored by an insurance company. That is, an insurer could easily send an
inspector to the insured gas station to observe fire safety precautions. The
insurer could then respond to the inspector's observations, either by
raising (or lowering) the gas station's premiums or by requiring that the
insured take appropriate precautions to minimize any observed reducible
risks. In contrast, in Scenario A, there is less an insurer could do to
monitor the condition of the underground storage tank-the insurer could
require that the gas station install the safest type of tank initially, but
have considerably reduced the risk of spills from underground storage tanks. See, e.g.,
Technical Standards and Corrective Action Requirements for Owners and Operators of
Underground Storage Tanks ("UST"), 40 C.F.R. pt. 280 (1999). In spite of the examples'
somewhat unrealistic simplicity, however, they well illustrate the workings of the Shavell
model in the environmental context.
191 See supra Part II.B. 1-2.
192 Of course, the liability regime may vary if, for example, an unrelated third party
caused the damage to the tank in Scenario B. As the discussion in Part I.C.5 indicates,
however, the Shavell model recommends the same form of liability insurance whether the
prevailing liability standard is negligence or strict liability as long as there is some uncer-
tainty in determining negligence. For purposes of this discussion, a strict liability regime is
assumed.
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would have more difficulty monitoring subsequent changes in the condi-
tion of the tanks (resulting, for example, from changes in rainfall and soil
moisture). Scenario B falls between Scenarios A and C. The insurer
could monitor construction activity in the vicinity of the gas station but
might have difficulty accurately adjusting station B's premium to account
for changes in risk levels.
The second important difference among the scenarios relates to the
probability that each gas station will become insolvent or otherwise es-
cape liability for the pollution losses. Scenario A involves a long slow
leak with no obvious cause. The leak could continue for years before it is
discovered, at which point gas station A may well be insolvent.' By
contrast, in Scenario C, the cause of the damage to the gas tank is an
abrupt, observable event, which reduces the likelihood that the leak will
remain undetected indefinitely. Again, Scenario B is somewhere in the
middle. If the construction crew reports the damage to the tank, then the
leak will not continue undetected for long. On the other hand, if the dam-
age remains unreported, the leak could continue undiscovered as in Sce-
nario A.
The long delay between onset and discovery of pollution in Scenario
A (and possibly also Scenario B) also poses a "causation problem" for
victims who try to sue the gas station."9 That is, it may be difficult for
the victims to identify and prove the source of the leak after the contami-
nation is discovered."' The pollution in Scenario C, by contrast, is easily
traceable to the gas station and the explosion event.""
,91 See, e.g., Alison Watts, Insolvency and Division of Cleanup Costs, 18 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 61, 61 (1998) (discussing ways to recover cleanup costs "assigned to ... insol-
vent dumpers" of hazardous waste). This particular long-term leakage problem is less
likely in the wake of the EPA's promulgation of standards for USTs, which require gas
stations to test at least monthly for leaks from USTs. See Requirements for Petroleum UST
Systems, 40 C.F.R. § 280.41 (1999). Nevertheless, leakage of petroleum from USTs re-
mains a significant problem. See Mark D. Oshinskie, Tanks for Nothing: Oil Company
Liability for Discharges of Gasoline from Underground Storage Tanks Divested to Station
Owners, 18 VA. ENvTL L.J. 1, 3-4 (1999) (discussing the ongoing problem of leaking
USTs in New Jersey, and noting that the state has "numerous abandoned [gasoline] sta-
tions, many of which may have corroded USTs").
194 See generally Grad, supra note 83, at 10,105-07 (discussing the causation problem
in toxic torts).
195 Sophisticated hydrogeological modeling techniques make identifying and proving
the source(s) of underground leaks far easier than they once were, but the process remains
difficult and expensive. For a colorful account of the inherent difficulties of tracing a con-
taminant to its source(s), see JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION t1995).
'9 All three scenarios may also pose some of the classic, toxic-tort causation prob-
lems. For example, if some ill plaintiffs claim that the pollution caused their illnesses, the)
will have to be able to prove not only that there is an increased risk of illness in the area
but also that the increased risk may be causally connected to the pollution. See. e.g.. Brock
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified. 884 F2d 166. 1(6
(5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to "present statistically significant epide-
miological proof' that the chemical in question-Bendectin--caused the victim's birth
defects); Koehn v. Ayers, 26 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (remarking on the
plaintiffs' failure to produce "any substantiated conclusions about the medical probability
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Applying the Shavell model to these three scenarios suggests the
following conclusions: (1) because the risks involved in Scenario C are
reducible and the insurer can easily monitor station C's level of care, the
insurer should provide, and the gas station should purchase, full coverage
of the resulting pollution losses; 197 and (2) because the risks involved in
Scenarios A and B are also reducible, but the insurer cannot as easily
monitor stations A and B, the stations should opt for less than full cover-
age to reduce the problem of moral hazard and their premium pay-
ments;'98 but (3) because stations A and B are more likely to become in-
solvent or otherwise escape liability, society should consider forbidding
insurance of events like those described in Scenarios A and B to reduce
the problem of moral hazard and, in turn, the likelihood of loss. 199
Restating these conclusions in terms of the pollution exclusion
clause, then, the Shavell model suggests that the CGL policy should
cover "boom" events, such as that in Scenario C, but should exclude long-
lasting events (even if abrupt in onset), such as that in Scenario A, and
probably also that in Scenario B. That is, the Shavell model indicates that
the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion should
be limited to unexpected events of abrupt onset and short duration.
2. What Must Be "Sudden and Accidental," the Discharge or the
Resulting Loss?
The above analysis indicates that the "sudden and accidental" ex-
ception should only restore coverage for short-lived and unexpected
events. Assuming, however, that a court instead finds that the exception
covers all unexpected events regardless of duration, a second question
arises: which event must be unexpected to qualify for coverage, the ini-
tial discharge of pollutants or the resulting personal injury or property
damage?2° Again, the Shavell model offers insights into the ramifications
of this question for insurers, insureds, victims, and the public.
For purposes of this analysis, consider the following hypothetical
situation. A company produces a substance XYZ as a byproduct of its op-
erations. XYZ is not a known toxin at the time it is produced. The com-
pany regularly dumps XYZ in the stream that runs past its plant. Several
decades later, XYZ is discovered to be a severe carcinogen.
Under the Shavell model, this scenario can be characterized in two
ways. On the one hand, one can focus narrowly on the discharge of XYZ
that [their] injuries were caused in whole or even in part by exposure to environmental
toxins"). These causation problems would affect equally the plaintiffs in any of the three
scenarios, however, so these causation problems are not relevant to the current analysis.
197 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
199 See supra Part II.C.5.c.
200 See supra Part III.A.2.
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and the fact that the pollutant's toxic effects are unknown at the time it is
discharged into the stream. Using this reasoning, one can characterize the
ex ante risks of discharging XYZ as irreducible; because the risks of XYZ
are entirely unknown at the time the compound is produced, there is little
the company can voluntarily do to reduce those risks. This characteriza-
tion seems particularly reasonable if one imagines that when the com-
pany first begins producing XYZ, no organic chemicals are known to be
carcinogens, so the company is ignorant not only about the specific haz-
ards of XYZ, but about the hazards of any organic byproduct."'
On the other hand, if one assumes that the company begins produc-
ing XYZ at a time when the risks of XYZ are unknown, but the risks posed
by other carcinogenic byproducts are widely known, then the risks of
discharging XYZ appear eminently reducible. Recognizing that discharg-
ing any organic compound with unknown properties poses a non-zero
risk, the company could choose not to dispose of XYZ at all, or not to
dispose of it without first testing its health effects.
To determine the optimal liability insurance regime under this sec-
ond characterization of the risks of discharging XYZ, one must evaluate
the extent to which an insurer can monitor the company's discharge ac-
tivities. The hypothetical supposes that the company deliberately and
openly discharges XYZ, suggesting that an insurer can easily monitor the
company's activities. Because these discharges, by assumption, take
place at a time when the general risks posed by discharging organic
chemicals are known, most insurers will probably choose to monitor the
company's activities, and to draft a coverage policy that explicitly ex-
cludes coverage of losses resulting from willful discharge of organic
chemicals with unknown properties.
Thus, applying the Shavell model to this hypothetical generates two
divergent recommendations. If little is known about carcinogenic com-
pounds at the time the discharge occurs, then the risks posed by the com-
pany's activities are effectively irreducible. Ex ante, both insurer and in-
sured should opt for full coverage of the losses resulting from this sort of
willful (but uninformed) discharge. On the other hand, if the carcino-
genic properties of some organic chemicals are well known at the time of
discharge, then the risks posed by the company's activities are reducible.
Ex ante, both insurer and insured should opt for a policy that explicitly
denies coverage of losses resulting from this sort of willful discharge, to
provide the company with an incentive to investigate the properties of
XYZ before discharging it.
201 To take a simple example, prior to the discovery of the hazards of smoking, one
might have characterized the risk of lung cancer as irreducible. Similarly, prior to the dis-
covery of the role that chlorofluorocarbons play in depletion of the ozone layer, one might
have described the risks of localized atmospheric ozone depletion as irreducible.
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Restating these conclusions in terms of the qualified pollution exclu-
sion, the Shavell model suggests that if a discharge occurs at a time when
a "reasonable" polluter (or insurer) would recognize that its actions posed
some risks, then later, when the resulting losses are discovered, the "sud-
den and accidental" exception should be interpreted to exclude coverage
unless the pollution event itself (and not just the losses) occurred unex-
pectedly.
3. Which Discharge Is Relevant, Initial Disposal or
Subsequent Leakage?
If a court applies the "sudden and accidental" requirement to a pol-
luter's initial discharge, rather than to any resulting losses, it must also
decide which discharge is relevant, the initial disposal of the pollutant or
the subsequent leakage of the pollutant from the disposal site.2 02 To
evaluate this question under the Shavell model, consider the following
two scenarios, both of which involve a company that produces significant
quantities of a known carcinogen, XYZ:
Scenario A-"sudden and accidental" discharge: The company
stores XYZ on the premises. A fire at the factory causes significant quan-
tities of the compound to leak, contaminating a nearby stream.
Scenario B- "sudden and accidental" leakage from a disposal site:
The company legally dumps XYZ at a landfill. The landfill suddenly and
unexpectedly begins to leak. The compound contaminates a nearby stream.
The similarities between these scenarios are much as in Part IV.A. I
above. The risks involved in both scenarios are reducible, as the company
in Scenario A could probably have taken greater precautions against fire,
and the company in Scenario B could have done more to ensure that the
landfill was adequately sealed against leakage. In addition, in both sce-
narios the company and its victims are presumably equally risk-averse,
and there is no reason to suppose that the company is more likely to be
judgment proof in one scenario than the other. Finally, both scenarios
involve analogous accidents that result in losses of similar nature and scope,
and both scenarios probably therefore involve similar liability regimes2 0'
There are, however, two relevant differences between these scenar-
ios. First, Scenario A is more likely to involve a situation that the com-
pany's insurer could monitor adequately. In Scenario B, the fact that the
level of care at issue is that of a contractor one step removed from the
insured significantly reduces the insurer's ability to affect that level of
care.204 In addition, company B is more likely to escape liability than is
202 See supra Part III.A.3.
203 The liability regime might be different in Scenario B if the discharge involves neg-
ligence on the part of the landfill operator. For purposes of this discussion, however, simi-
lar liability regimes will be assumed. See supra note 192.
204 The insurer in Scenario B could, of course, structure the corporation's liability pol-
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company A, particularly if the landfill in Scenario B contains toxic
effluent from several nearby industries. That is, assuming the company in
Scenario B is not the only landfill supplier, a spill victim will have trou-
ble determining and proving the source of the offending chemicals.
Applying the Shavell model to these scenarios suggests that full in-
surance may be appropriate in Scenario A, but some type of partial insur-
ance (for example, coverage that includes a high deductible, a low ceil-
ing, or a provision denying insurance in case of negligence on the part of
third-party contractors) is more appropriate in Scenario B to reduce the
moral hazard problem.205 Further, if there is a significant possibility that
the company in Scenario B may escape liability, this may be a situation
in which society should consider forbidding liability insurance. : '-' Re-
phrasing these conclusions in terms of the "sudden and accidental" ex-
ception to the 1973 pollution exclusion, the Shavell model indicates that
the exception should cover only "sudden and accidental" primary dis-
charges, not unexpected secondary discharges from a disposal site.
4. "Sudden and Accidental" frot Whose Point of Weis'?
The final question relating to interpretation of the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception asks whose point of view is relevant in determining
whether a pollution event was unexpected and unintended. : '7 That is,
should the "sudden and accidental" exception allow coverage of events
deliberately caused by some third party as long as those events were both
unexpected and unintended from the point of view of the insured? Again,
application of the Shavell model suggests one possible answer.
Consider the following scenarios, each of which involves industrial
production of a known carcinogen, XYZ:
Scenario A-a "boonz event": Company Q produces XYZ and stores
it on the premises. A fire causes an explosion, releasing significant quan-
tities of XYZ that contaminate a nearby stream.
Scenario B-deliberate pollution by a vandal: Company Q produces
XYZ and stores it on the premises. A vandal breaks into Q's factory and
releases significant quantities of XYZ. The compound contaminates a
nearby stream.
Scenario C--deliberate pollution by a predecessor in interest:
Predecessor Company produces XYZ and deliberately disposes of it in a
nearby stream. Company Q takes over the business from Predecessor
prior to public discovery of the contamination of the stream.
icy to strengthen the corporation's incentives to pick a reliable and safe landfill. but this is
a far clumsier method of ensuring an adequate level of care on the part of the landfill than
is direct monitoring.
20 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
'6 See supra Part II.C.5.c.
See supra Part III.A.4.
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As in Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.3, these scenarios all involve reducible
risks, in that company Q could have taken precautions against explosions
in Scenario A, protected its property against vandals in Scenario B, and
investigated the premises prior to purchasing the property in Scenario C.
In addition, there is no reason why company Q's assets, or the attitudes
toward risk of Q or its victims, should vary between scenarios. Further,
all three scenarios involve accidents of similar type and scope, and Sce-
narios A and B may also involve similar liability regimes. °0 Finally, in
contrast to the situations discussed in Parts IV.A. 1 and IV.A.3 above, Q is
unlikely to escape liability in any of these scenarios due to bankruptcy or
questions of causation.
Again, however, one difference among the scenarios is highly rele-
vant to analysis under the Shavell model: an insurer could monitor com-
pany Q's actions in Scenario A more easily than in Scenario B or C. In
Scenario A, company Q's insurer could observe Q's fire safety precau-
tions and fine-tune Q's liability policy to grant coverage only for those fires
against which Q took adequate precautions. By contrast, an insurer would
have more difficulty monitoring Q's precautions against vandals or Q's
care in investigating Predecessor. Thus, in Scenarios B and C, it would be
difficult for the insurer to fine-tune Q's liability policy in response to Q's
level of care. As a result, in Scenarios B and C, both company Q and its
insurer may choose ex ante to structure Q's liability policy to deny cov-
erage in cases in which Q's dealings with third parties result in a pollu-
tion event; this structure would provide Q with sufficient incentive to
exercise care in those dealings and would, in turn, reduce Q's premiums.
In terms of the qualified pollution exclusion clause, then, this conclusion
suggests that ex ante, the parties would prefer the "sudden and acciden-
tal" exception to cover only those events that are unexpected and unin-
tended from all points of view. That is, the exception should not restore
coverage for pollution events that are deliberately caused by third parties.
B. The "As Damages" Issue
As mentioned above 209 the qualified pollution exclusion is not the
only barrier to recovering environmental liability expenses under the
1973 standard-form CGL policy. In many cases, the standard-form pol-
icy's coverage language itself limits recovery of environmental losses.
208 In fact, under current law the liability regime in Scenario C may also resemble that
in Scenarios A and B because CERCLA provides that successor corporations are "liable
for the cleanup costs of substances disposed of on the site prior to the time that the succes-
sor company purchased the site." Thomas, supra note 118, at 189. Of course, the liability
regimes may still differ because of the involvement of third parties in Scenarios B and C.
Nevertheless, similar liability regimes will be assumed for purposes of this analysis. See
supra note 192.
209 See supra Part III.B.
[Vol. 25
2001] Environmental Insurance: Does It Defy the Rules? 305
One particularly contentious issue regarding this language is whether the
policy's requirement that expenses be payable "as damages" should pre-
clude recovery of statutory and court-ordered cleanup costs.2-t "Case law
on this issue is sharply divided.'
2
1'
To explore this question under the Shavell model, consider a situa-
tion in which an indisputably "sudden and accidental" pollution event212
results in significant contamination of soil under a factory. Mitigating
this damage requires washing and treating large quantities of soil, and
then properly disposing of the runoff from the washing process. The costs
of this decontamination process could easily exceed the total amount of
property damage and personal injury losses caused by the contamination.
In this situation, the Shavell model indicates that full insurance is
inefficient and might even create a significant moral hazard because the
cleanup costs are both uncertain 2 3 and uncapped t 4 ex ante. As discussed
earlier, the Shavell model suggests that if insurers cannot accurately es-
timate expected losses, they cannot set premiums correctly and may
choose not to offer coverage at all. 2 1 In turn, because premiums do not
accurately reflect expected losses, insureds purchase either too much or
210 ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 291 (citing the CGL poli-
cies issued by the ISO in 1973).211 Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (applying Missouri law).
212 For example, suppose the pollution event is caused by a natural disaster. The ex
ante risks of this disaster are largely irreducible, so the Shavell model suggests that full
coverage should be available for the direct consequences of the disaster, including personal
injury and property damage. The question that remains, therefore, is whether coverage
should be available for more indirect costs, such as mitigation.213 This uncertainty is particularly problematic for insurers and insureds in light of
CERCLA's open-ended liability scheme because "liability is not limited to the diminution
in the value of the property contaminated, nor even to the total value of that property prior
to contamination:' and further, "[s]ince CERCLA liability is retroactive, strict, and ...
joint and several, the liability imposed on an insurer of even a non-negligent offsite gen-
erator of waste could be enormous." ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE. supra note
3, at 70; but see Jonathan R. Nash, Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the
Availability of Hazardous Waste Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. Aht. L 455,490 (positing that in
fact, "the majority of companies that generate hazardous waste deal with it themselhes"
rather than disposing of it in large landfills with the wastes generated by other companies.
in part to avoid the problems associated with CERCLA's joint and several liability regime).
Professors Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky argue on economic grounds that polluters
should not face CERCLA-like liability for steep cleanup costs because "imposing liability
exactly equal to the harm that remains from a discharge after appropriate cleanup has been
undertaken, not the (higher) cost of fully restoring the natural resource" will lead to the
"socially optimal outcome: firms will appropriately clean up and take proper precautions,
and consumers will purchase the correct amount of the goods whose production leads to
discharges:' A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Li-
ability after Environmentally Harnifid Discharges, 16 Ras. IN L. & EcoN. 17. 22. 18
(1994). As discussed earlier, however, this Note considers not the optimal liability scheme
for pollution events, but rather the optimal form of insurance in the presence of an existing
liability scheme.
214 That is, the costs are not limited by the diminution in value of the property, nor
even by the fair market value of the property.21
-1 See supra Part II.C.3.
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too little coverage.216 Further, uncertainty in calculating expected losses
reduces insurers' ability to differentiate among insureds on the grounds
of the risks they pose217 and to structure policies that provide insureds
with appropriate incentives to minimize risks. 18 As a result, insurers have
limited ability to confront the problem of moral hazard.
According to Shavell's model, then, insurers, insureds, victims, and
the public should all prefer that polluters not receive coverage of highly
uncertain cleanup costs: insurers because they cannot set premiums accu-
rately to be sure of covering their costs; insureds because premiums do
not accurately reflect expected losses; and victims and the public because
of the significant moral hazard problem.1 9 Thus, in terms of the 1973
CGL policy, the Shavell model suggests that the "as damages" require-
ment should be interpreted to exclude cleanup costs in those situations in
which the costs are both uncertain and uncapped ex ante.
C. The Absolute Pollution Exclusion
In response to the numerous coverage issues raised by the 1973 CGL
policy's coverage provision and qualified pollution exclusion, the insur-
ance industry revised the pollution exclusion clause in 1986 and elimi-
nated the exception that allowed coverage for "sudden and accidental"
discharges. The 1986 exclusion (and subsequent revisions thereof) thus
represents the industry's attempt clearly and unambiguously to eliminate
coverage of any pollution events under general liability policies. Despite
216 See id.
217 This inability to differentiate among insureds based on the degree of risk each poses
not only decreases insurers' motivation to structure policies that increase insureds' incen-
tives to take care, see infra note 218 and accompanying text, but also exacerbates the
problem of adverse selection, see supra note 64.
M18 See infra note 226.
This problem is particularly evident in cases governed by CERCLA, as non-negligent
waste generators can be held liable for significant cleanup costs. See supra note 213. In
such cases, insurers lack adequate inducement to tie availability of coverage to an insured's
level of care, and without the incentive provided by a carefully structured insurance policy,
insureds lack inspiration to exercise due care because they could well face significant
cleanup liability no matter how careful they have been. See Kehne, supra note 96, at 409
("If differences in loss-prevention measures have little bearing on expected liability, insur-
ers will find it unprofitable to discriminate among insureds on the basis of safety prac-
tices.").
219 Consider, for example, CERCLA's strict, retroactive, and joint-and-several liability
regime governing cleanup costs, and the consequent moral hazard problem created by in-
surers' inability to "discriminate among insureds on the basis of safety practices." Kehne.
supra note 96, at 409. Forbidding insurance coverage of this liability (or requiring a
significant deductible) would reduce the problem of moral hazard because potential pollut-
ers would be forced to internalize some of the costs of any unsafe practices (although they
remain insulated from the full costs of those practices by the joint-and-several liability
regime). By contrast, if all potential polluters purchase full insurance, and insurers can do
nothing to encourage insureds to exercise care, insureds are fully insulated from the costs
of any unsafe practices and thus have markedly reduced incentives to improve their safety
practices.
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the broad language of the new exclusion, however, many coverage dis-
putes still arise, and insureds are occasionally successful in obtaining
coverage of pollution losses, particularly when the pollution events in
question involve routine, on-the-job exposure to hazardous substances.2"
As in the discussion of the "as damages" issue above, the Shavell
model does not provide a direct answer to the question of whether in-
sureds should receive compensation for personal injury losses caused by
routine exposures to toxic chemicals under general liability insurance
policies. The model does, however, provide a framework for analysis of
individual coverage disputes. Suppose, for example, a dispute involves a
landlord in a low-rent neighborhood who owns only a few apartments,
some of which are painted with lead-based paint. Should this landlord's
CGL policy cover personal injury losses due to lead poisoning? De-
scribing this situation in terms of the Shavell model, (1) the losses are
clearly reducible; and (2) the activity (renting apartments) is relatively
easy for the insurer to monitor; but (3) the landlord may be insolvent:
and further, (4) the landlord may well escape liability in many instances,
as these victims are unlikely to have the knowledge or resources neces-
sary to bring suit." Thus, although the Shavell model would recommend
full coverage based solely on points (1) and (2) above, points (3 and
(4) indicate that this may be a situation in which society should consider
forbidding liability coverage at the outset to reduce the problem of moral
hazard. Thus, the Shavell model suggests that the absolute pollution
exclusion clause should be interpreted to exclude coverage for lead poi-
soning caused by routine exposure to lead paint.
Now, however, consider a different scenario. Suppose the insured is
a paint manufacturer, and the exposure in question results from employ-
ees' failure to use adequate safety precautions in handling paints. Char-
acterizing this risk situation in terms of the Shavell model, (I) the risks
are again highly reducible; and (2) the insurer can easily monitor the ac-
,,o See supra Part Ill.C.
221 See Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, The Lead Poisoning Challenge: An Approach for
California and Other States, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 387, 416 (1997). Professor Recht-
schaffen describes the dismal state of lead paint litigation as follows.
Tort litigation will provide compensation for only a very small percentage of in-
jured children. . . . Many families are unaware that their children are lead-
poisoned. Other families are unaware of their legal rights or are reluctant to con-
sult lawyers. Tenants may also forego litigation because of fear of landlord re-
taliation or of losing low rent housing. Harsh legal economics will discourage
private attorneys from taking many cases, particularly those involving indigent
families.... [P]roving the elements of a negligence claim, particularly causation.
can be quite difficult. Owners of some of the worst housing are judgment proof or
have no insurance.
Id (internal citations omitted).
2 See supra Part II.B.
2 See supra Parts U.C.7, II.C.7.
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tivity (by visiting regularly to observe safety procedures); but now,
(3) the insured paint manufacturer is likely to be solvent; and (4) the
manufacturer is unlikely to escape liability. In this scenario, therefore,
the Shavell model suggests that full coverage of the personal injury
losses caused by this routine exposure is optimal for deterrence pur-
poses.224
Overall, then, the recommendations of the Shavell model with re-
spect to compensation for personal injury losses caused by routine expo-
sure to toxic substances depend on the facts in question. In general, the
model suggests that if the risks involved are reducible and the activity
easily monitored, the CGL policy should be interpreted to provide full
coverage in spite of the absolute exclusion. In some cases, however, if the
insured is likely to escape liability or to be judgment proof, the model
seems to recommend that the absolute exclusion be invoked to deny cov-
erage.
D. Summary of the Shavell Model's Recommendations for
Coverage Disputes
In conclusion, the Shavell model recommends that all but one of the
coverage disputes discussed in this Note be resolved in favor of the in-
surer. With respect to the qualified pollution exclusion, the model indi-
cates that the "sudden and accidental" exception should be interpreted to
restore coverage only for pollution events that are unexpected, abrupt,
and short-lived because allowing coverage of slower events (even if un-
expected) leads to a moral hazard problem, as insureds are more likely to
escape liability or to be insolvent by the time suit is brought. Addition-
ally, the model suggests that only unexpected discharges, not unexpected
property or personal injury losses, should be covered under the exception
(as long as the discharge took place at a time at which the general haz-
ards posed by discharging substances of unknown properties were
known) to provide insureds with adequate incentives to minimize dis-
charges of such substances. The model also advises that coverage be ex-
cluded for unexpected secondary discharges (from landfills, for example)
to increase insureds' incentives to exercise care in choosing reliable third
parties with whom to contract. For similar reasons, the model advises
that the "sudden and accidental" exception should only restore coverage
for pollution events that are entirely unexpected from all points of view.
Finally, with respect to the "as damages" issue, the model's recommen-
dations serve insurers, as the model suggests that unless environmental
cleanup costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy ex ante, or at
least capped, the "as damages" requirement should preclude coverage of
such costs.
214 See supra Part II.B.
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It is only in the context of the absolute pollution exclusion that the
model gives a more equivocal response. Under the model, full coverage
of personal injury losses caused by routine exposure to pollutants is ad-
visable, as long as insureds seem unlikely to escape liability or to be
judgment proof. If the insured may be insolvent or escape liability, how-
ever, the model once again comes out in favor of the insurer because in
these circumstances, granting coverage of uncertain and uncapped cleanup
costs exacerbates the problem of moral hazard.
V. CRITIQUE OF THE SHAVELL MODEL'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Having described the Shavell model's recommendations on several
real-world environmental insurance disputes, it is now important to ask
why the model leads to those conclusions, and whether the conclusions
make sense when the assumptions of the model are relaxed.
A. Does the Shavell Model Have Inherent Biases?
As the following discussion demonstrates, the Shavell model delib-
erately incorporates certain biased assumptions that in turn dictate the
model's conclusions. To see this, consider the three basic conclusions of
the model that effectively dictate its recommendations regarding the CGL
policy interpretation questions discussed above. First, the model empha-
sizes that in situations in which risks are uncertain and possibly inde-
pendent of an individual insured's level of care (as in the case of envi-
ronmental cleanup costs), the advantages of insurance as a method of
distributing the risk of liability without decreasing the deterrence effects
of that liability are significantly reduced. As a result, in such situations,
insurers, insureds, and victims may not be made better off by the avail-
ability of liability insurance, and society may choose to forbid coverage
at the outset. Second, the model indicates that in scenarios in which the
relevant level of care is not only that of the insured but also that of a
known third party (such as a landfill operator), insurers, insureds, and
victims may opt to draft policies that preclude coverage of losses negli-
gently caused by the third party to provide insureds with adequate incen-
tives to monitor third parties' level of care. --' Third, the model demon-
strates that in circumstances in which there is significant risk that in-
sureds will be insolvent or escape liability entirely, the availability of
insurance can exacerbate the problem of moral hazard, which in turn
harms victims (and, in this case, taxpayers) and again suggests that soci-
ety may wish to forbid liability insurance. As these three basic conclu-
sions make clear, the model incorporates an essential underlying premise:
2 This will be particularly true if the insurer is not itself able to monitor the insured's
interactions with the third party.
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the advantages of liability insurance are greatly reduced, and potentially
even eliminated, in situations in which the availability of insurance in-
terferes with the deterrence function of liability.
This Note incorporated the model's underlying premise without
question in applying the model to the various CGL policy coverage dis-
putes discussed in Part IV. The outcome of that exercise, however, stg-
gests certain problems with the model as applied to environmental insur-
ance questions. Consider whether the model's premise in fact ensures the
socially optimal result in an analysis of a pollution-liability coverage
question. As noted in Part IV.D, the model recommends resolution of
most of the disputes regarding coverage of pollution events under the
1973 and 1986 CGL policies in favor of the insurer. This recommenda-
tion is not obviously objectionable until one considers that many of the
situations in which the Shavell model indicates that coverage should be
unavailable are precisely those situations in which the insured is least
likely to be able to compensate victims or to cover the costs of environ-
mental cleanup-namely, those situations in which (1) expected losses
are highly uncertain and uncapped ex ante, (2) insureds may be insol-
vent, 226 or (3) insureds may escape liability.2 27 This uncomfortable reali-
zation provokes two questions. First, why does the Shavell model sys-
tematically disfavor insurance in cases in which insureds are least likely
to be able to cover the costs of the losses caused by their actions? And
second, if the model's recommendations prove unpalatable in the envi-
ronmental context, how could one alter either the model itself or real-
world circumstances to achieve a more satisfactory solution?
B. The Shavell Model Assumes the Existence of Adequate and Efficient
First-Party Insurance To Compensate Victims of Loss
That the foregoing analysis of coverage issues under the 1973 COL
policy and the 1973 and 1986 pollution exclusion clauses leads so fre-
quently to outcomes that favor insurers rather than insureds results di-
rectly from the Shavell model's emphasis on the deterrence and risk-
226 This may not seem like a significant issue for those used to thinking of insurance in
the context of catastrophic accidents. In the environmental context, however, many injuries
are slow to arise or to be discovered, greatly increasing the probability that the injurer will
be insolvent, or will not exist, by the time suit is brought. See, e.g., Oshinskie, supra note
193, at 3-4 (recognizing that petroleum leaks from USTs at gas stations may not be dis-
covered until long after the stations have gone out of business and the tanks have been
abandoned); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Gao. L. J.
2025, 2026-27 (1999) (discussing the regulatory implications of the long latency period of
many diseases caused by exposure to hazardous substances).
217 As noted above, the model also recommends against coverage in situations in which
accidents may be caused by third parties. This recommendation does not raise the same
concerns, however, as there is no particular reason to suppose that situations involving
third parties are a priori more likely to be situations in which a polluter would be unable to
cover the costs of an accident in the absence of insurance coverage.
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spreading functions rather than the compensation function of liability
insurance. The model's bias is not accidental. It results directly (and pur-
posely) from Shavell's conviction that first-party insurance is a more
efficient source of compensation for victims than third-party liability in-
surance.' This conviction enables Shavell to argue, for example, that in
cases in which injurers may be judgment proof, society may wish to for-
bid insurance to maximize the deterrence effects of liability.- Without
an underlying notion either that liability results in perfect deterrence and
avoidance of all accidents, which Shavell does not suggest, or that an
adequate and efficient alternative source of compensation for victims ex-
ists, which he does,2-3 this argument would be far more objectionable.
Therefore, to evaluate the Shavell model's recommendations for
pollution liability coverage, one must first determine whether the model's
deliberate underemphasis of the compensation function of liability insur-
ance is justified in the environmental context. This Note argues that it is
not, for two basic reasons. First, many environmental accidents involve
losses to the commons rather than to private individuals, and no suitable
analog to first-party insurance exists for such public losses. Second, even
in situations involving only private victims, first-party insurance may
prove an inefficient and ineffective source of compensation for victims of
environmental losses.23
2,8 See supra note 94.
29 See supra Part II.C.7.
230 See supra note 94.
2i Some authors dispute the assertion that first-party insurance is necessarily a more
efficient source of compensation than enterprise liability even in other, more typical con-
texts. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. REG. 1 (1991). Croley and
Hanson question three "[p]urported [s]hortcomings" of "manufacturer-provided insur-
ance": its allegedly higher administrative costs, its purported award of undesired damages
for non-pecuniary losses, and its assumed inability to "cope" with the problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection. Ld. at 14, 23. The authors suggest that each of these pur-
ported shortcomings may be unfounded: (1) "the total administrative costs of accident
recovery through both the tort and first-party insurance systems may well be less under an
enterprise liability regime than they would be under a cost-benefit negligence regime' id.
at 110; (2) awarding non-pecuniary loss damages may well serve deterrence goals, sug-
gesting that such damages are not entirely inefficient, see id. and finally (3) "manufacturer-
provided insurance can and does employ mechanisms analogous to the deductibles and
copayment mechanisms of first-party insurance:' id. Thus, in Croley and Hanson's view.
the efficiency benefits of first-party insurance may not be as great as some authors suggest,
and therefore "courts should move toward enterprise liability, unashamedly." hL at 11l.
See also Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990) ("[llt is
plausible (especially given the failure of first-party insurers to adjust premiums according
to consumption choices) that enterprise liability [is] superior" to first-party insurance in
providing compensation).
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1. Unavailability of First-Party Insurance for Public
Environmental Losses
To explore the availability of first-party insurance for public losses,
consider the following situation: an insured company buries toxic waste
in fifty-five-gallon drums on its property; the drums leak slowly over a
period of years; a nearby river and surrounding land become contami-
nated; during the same period, the company goes out of business and is
dissolved. 32 In this scenario, once the contamination is discovered, nu-
merous victims may wish to seek compensation from the company or its
insurer: individuals who suffer cancers and other illnesses that may have
been caused by exposure to the toxic substance, individuals whose prop-
erty value falls when the contamination is discovered, and individuals
whose use of the river (for drinking water, for fishing, swimming, or ca-
noeing, or simply for its aesthetic value) is affected by the contamina-
tion. 33 One can debate whether medical and homeowners insurance are
more efficient sources of compensation than third-party liability insur-
ance for the first two categories of victims, but it is difficult to imagine a
workable system of first-party insurance that would compensate the indi-
viduals whose losses consist entirely of a reduction in canoe-hours on the
now-polluted river
As this scenario makes clear, many victims of environmental acci-
dents suffer only indirect losses as a result of damage to the commons.
One simply cannot construct a first-party insurance system that would
compensate these individuals for the reduction in their quality of life due
to the accident.2 4
232 Lest this scenario appear too extreme, consider the following descriptions of the
methods used by the Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. ("NEPACCO") to dis-
pose of byproducts generated during its manufacture of hexachlorophene:
The manufacturing process produced a variety of hazardous wastes, including the
highly toxic chemical dioxin. In ... 1971 NEPACCO disposed of about eighty-
five 55-gallon drums of hazardous wastes by burying them in a trench on a farm
.... Many of the drums had deteriorated and were in poor condition at the time
of disposal; many broke open when they were dumped in the trench. A strong
chemical odor persisted in the immediate area of the ... farm site for several
months thereafter.
Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (applying Missouri law).
23 This latter category could potentially include all of the people who used the river
anywhere downstream of the source of the contamination, including people in other states,
and possibly even other countries. Environmental accidents thus present unique cross-
boundary issues that further complicate analysis.
2 Aside from its general absurdity, there are also numerous practical difficulties with
the notion of first-party insurance for damage to one's individual "share" of the commons.
Among other things, air and water quality are affected by every aspect of life in an indus-
trial society. As a result, any first-party insurance policy that promised compensation for
reductions in air quality would, for example, have to compensate insureds every time they
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2. Relative Inefficiency of First-Part), Insurance in the
Environmental Context
Of course, in the above scenario, the angry canoer could not recover
the value of her lost canoe-hours in tort, either-her only hope lies in
restoration of the river. This observation leads directly to the second ar-
gument against relying on first-party insurance as a method of paying the
bill for environmental accidents: such first-party insurance is unlikely to
be as efficient in the environmental context as in other contexts, and may
well be far less efficient than enterprise liability and third-party insurance
as a method of compensating victims for existing losses, preventing fu-
ture harms, and restoring the environment to its ex ante condition.- 5
There are three primary reasons for the reduced relative efficiency of
first-party insurance in the environmental context. First, in many situa-
tions, the cheapest solution to an environmental problem may be to re-
move the source of the contamination, rather than to continue indefinitely
to compensate individual victims. Such environmental cleanup can obvi-
ously be accomplished far more efficiently by one or a few polluters
(possibly using funds supplied by insurers) than by a group of unrelated
individual victims. Individual victims not only face significant transac-
tion costs in organizing to undertake a cleanup effort, but they also have
far less information about the true source, nature, and extent of the con-
tamination than does the polluter, and they may have less expertise in
handling the materials in question.2
6
Second, polluters may themselves be aware of contamination well
before it affects third parties. In such situations, it will likely be more
economically efficient for the polluter to remedy the contamination be-
fore property damage or personal injury losses occur. -7 Clearly, however,
used a dry cleaner or pumped gasoline.
235 This Note argues only that first-party insurance is less efficient in the environmental
context than in other contexts and that some of the common arguments in favor of first-
party insurance are not applicable in the context of environmental losses. The Note does
not revisit the many other general arguments regarding the relative efficiency of first-party
insurance. For further discussion of these arguments, see supra notes 94 and 231 and arti-
cles cited therein.
2 6 This argument is related, though not identical, to the argument that in the absence
of a first-party source of funds, cleanup costs can be borne more efficiently by polluters
than by taxpayers. See James J. Reardon, Jr., Limiting Municipal Solid iaste Liability
under CERCLA: Towards the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993. 20 B.C.
ENVTL. Arr. L. Rv. 533, 569 (1993) ("[llndustrial polluters are more efficient at distrib-
uting the cost of hazardous waste disposal because they may pass the costs of disposal and
cleanup on to the buyers of their products in the form of higher prices. Raising taxes is a
less, if not a completely, inefficient mode of sending proper price signals to consumers.").
Professor Reardon's argument assumes the absence of first-party insurance, however.
whereas the argument in the text may hold true even in cases in which medical or home-
owners insurance is available as a source of funds for victims.
2-37CERCLA recognizes this possibility. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §9601(23) (19941
(defining the terms "remove" and "removal" in the CERCLA provision that allows the
President to "act ... to remove or arrange for the removal of" hazardous substances as
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polluters have little incentive to undertake preventive cleanup measures if
they know they will never themselves face liability for subsequent losses
caused by the contamination.
Third, firms may be able to reduce or eliminate pollution risks
through relatively cheap improvements, such as installing smokestack
scrubbers to remove particulates from exhaust. 38 Unless the firms face
liability for all the costs of the pollution they create, however, they have
little incentive to undertake even those improvements whose benefits in
terms of pollution prevention far exceed their costs.23 9 Forcing polluters
to internalize the costs of pollution may induce them either to reduce
their activity level or "to implement more environmentally efficient and
responsible technologies ... to reduce [their expected] environmental
cleanup costs."240
3. Additional Advantages of Third-Party Insurance in the
Environmental Context
In addition to the above factors that render enterprise liability rela-
tively more efficient in the pollution context, there is at least one oft-
cited disadvantage of enterprise liability as insurance-namely, that cor-
porate liability is regressive-that is less applicable in the environmental
than the products-liability context. The standard argument in the prod-
ucts-liability context runs as follows:
[T]he expansion of third-party tort law insurance directly harms
the poor among the consumer population. Obviously, the gen-
eral price increase consequent to the expansion of liability af-
fects those with low levels of resources most seriously. More
importantly, the benefit low-income consumers receive from the
addition of the liability insurance premium to the price of a
product or service is worth less to them than its price. Again,
the liability insurance premium tied to the sale of a product or
including the "taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may other-
wise result from a release or threat of release" (emphasis added)).
238 This characteristic thus distinguishes pollution risks, which may or may not be a
necessary aspect of a manufacturing process, from health risks, which are often an inherent
aspect of a manufacturer's end product. That is, sale of cigarettes poses an irreducible
health risk, whereas manufacture of cigarettes poses a largely reducible pollution risk.
2 9 Because pollution is a uniquely "collective" problem, it "simply had never been
taken seriously" prior to 1970; "its social costs had been treated as an externality borne for
the most part by receptors as a class rather than assigned to polluters as a cost of doing
business." Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. RaV.
1189 (1986), reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY READER
171 (Robert C. Percival & Dorothy C. Alevizatos eds., 1997).
240 Colin Crawford, Some Thoughts on the North American Free Trade Agreement, Po-
litical Stability and Environmental Equity, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 585, 616 (1995).
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service must be set according to the average expected liability
payout. Tort judgments comprise medical expenditures, which
are typically greater for higher income patients; past and future
lost income; and damages representing pain and suffering,
which are highly correlated with lost income. The high correla-
tion of these damage elements with income, however, means
that the premiums set equal to the average damage payout will
undercharge high income consumers and overcharge low income
consumers. The provision of liability insurance tied to the sale
of products and services requires the low income to subsidize
the high income. 241
This argument fails in the environmental context because losses associ-
ated with environmental accidents are not randomly distributed with re-
spect to income; instead, the majority of these losses are born by low-
income communities.2 2 Thus, in the case of environmental losses (unlike
the losses discussed in the above example), "the benefit low-income con-
sumers receive from the addition of the liability insurance premium to
the price of a product or service" 243 may well be worth more to them than
its price, not only because they are more likely than wealthier consumers
to benefit from any resulting liability payout, but also because they will
disproportionately benefit from any reduction in the risk of environ-
mental accidents "purchased" along with the higher-priced product.
Overall, therefore, first-party insurance is a more dubious prospect
in the environmental arena than in most of the contexts considered by
Shavell and the other authors who have extolled its relative advantages as
a source of compensation for victims. For environmental losses resulting
indirectly from damage to the commons, first-party insurance may be
entirely unavailable. Further, even in those instances in which first-party
241 Priest, supra note 20, at 502.
242 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nv. U. L. REv. 787, 796 (1993) (discussing
"[e]vidence of [e]nvironmenta [ilnequity"); Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environ-
mental Racism, 7 NAT. REs. & ENVT. 23 (1993), reprinted in LA%' AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 239, at 103, 104 (arguing that "a form of illegal 'exaction' forces disen-
franchised communities [including many low-income communities] to pay the costs of
environmental benefits for the public at large"); see also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103
YALE L.J. 1383 (1994), reprinted in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 239, at 118,
119, 124. Professor Been suggests that although "those neighborhoods in which [locally
undesirable land uses ("LULUs")] are located .--.-are-poorer than non-host communities:'
that phenomenon may result not from deliberate discrimination in siting decisions but
rather from changes in neighborhood "characteristics following the siting:' This chicken-
or-egg question does not, however, affect the argument in the text. That is, regardless of the
source of the discrimination, as long as LULUs are disproportionately sited in poor com-
munities, low income people will receive a greater-than-average share of the benefits of
any liability insurance premium added to the price of the product or service provided by
the LULU.
243 Priest, supra note 20, at 502.
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insurance is readily available, it may be less efficient than enterprise li-
ability in providing compensation. Finally, at least one of the general ar-
guments invoked against enterprise liability-that it can be regressive-is
considerably weaker in the context of environmental losses.
Of course, this analysis is highly qualitative, and there may well be
scenarios involving environmental losses in which the relative advantages
of liability insurance in terms of compensation are outweighed by its dis-
advantages in terms of increased moral hazard. In some situations in
which polluters are likely to be judgment proof, it may still be worth-
while to forbid insurance, as Shavell advises, in spite of the resulting re-
duction of funds for compensation and cleanup. Nevertheless, the above
discussion raises the question whether the conclusions of the Shavell
model, which hinge in part on the availability and relative efficiency of
first-party insurance as a source of compensation for victims of loss, can
be applied as readily to questions of pollution liability.
C. The Shavell Model Assumes Risk Levels Can Easily Be Determined
There is one further difficulty with applying the Shavell model in the
environmental context: the model assumes that risk levels can easily be
determined before a loss occurs. The implications of this assumption are
not readily apparent from the analyses of CGL coverage issues discussed
above, as those analyses assumed the existence of a working environ-
mental liability insurance market. Nevertheless, the problem is important
to a thorough analysis of the Shavell model as a tool for analyzing envi-
ronmental insurance disputes.
As discussed above,2" Shavell's assumption that insurers can accu-
rately estimate the ex ante risk of loss is critical to the Shavell model's
central conclusion that in most circumstances insurers will choose to
provide, and potential injurers will choose to purchase, third-party liabil-
ity insurance. If this assumption is not met, insurers will charge too much
or too little for liability insurance, insureds will purchase too little or too
much coverage, and insureds' incentives to exercise care will be sub-
optimal. Worse still, if insurers are entirely unable to estimate risk levels,
they may choose not to provide liability insurance at all. In situations
involving risks that are difficult to estimate, therefore, the Shavell
model's sunny conclusion that regulation of liability insurance markets is
only necessary if insureds may be insolvent or escape liability may not
hold.
Unfortunately, many cases involving environmental losses fit this de-
scription. 45 Scientific uncertainties make the risk of environmental losses
244 See supra Part II.C.3.
245 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 118, at 212 ("The most severe problem in the Ameri-
can environmental liability insurance market has been excessive uncertainty about the
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difficult to estimate ex ante because the hazards of a product or activity
may be unforeseen, unforeseeable, or unpredictable at the time the prod-
uct is made or the activity occurs.2-6 For example, consider a company
that manufactures or distributes a potentially toxic substance:
[An insurer's ability to assess the potential future liabilities of
that company] suffers from fundamental uncertainties about
causal mechanisms for cancer and other hazards, extrapolative
relationships between high-dose and low-dose responses and
between animal test data and human risks, latent effects and la-
tency periods, special sensitivities in exposed subpopulations,
synergistic or co-carcinogenic effects of various substances,
past and present exposure levels, dispersion patterns for con-
taminants, and virtually every other area of required knowledge.
These uncertainties generally preclude reliable assessments of
relevant effects [of the substance].!' 7
Further, imposition of retroactive and joint-and-several liability under
statutes such as CERCLA greatly compounds the problem by reducing an
insurer's ability to predict or constrain the range of accidents for which
its insureds could seek coverage.
In turn, the difficulties inherent in environmental risk estimation re-
duce the likelihood that the insurance market will itself produce the op-
timal amount of liability insurance at the optimal price. As one author
summarized the situation, "unpredictability as to the boundaries of li-
ability has made it extraordinarily difficult for insurance companies to
insure for toxic wastes liabilities and, in many instances, insurance has
become unavailable.' 241 Thus, contrary to the Shavell model's predic-
tions, there may be situations in the environmental context in which li-
ability insurance is socially desirable (for purposes of deterrence, risk
spreading, or compensation) but unavailable without regulatory interven-
tion in the market.
D. Fitting the Model to the Envirounental Context
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Shavell model of liability
insurance, with its underemphasis of the compensation function of insur-
ance and simplistic assumptions about risk estimation, may not apply as
frequency and severity of environmental losses that will be suffered:.
246 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Future Prospects for Compensations Systems: Compen.
sation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1119 (19931 (discussing the
"special features of insurance for mass product-related torts").
247 Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment. 5 YLt J.
ON REG. 89, 91 (1998).
248 Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Hazardous
Wastes, 25 Hous. L. REv. 899, 920 (1988). See also supra note 118.
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readily to questions of environmental liability as to questions of product
liability. The next step in the analysis, therefore, is to consider ways of
adapting the model to account for the weaknesses of the first-party insur-
ance market in the environmental context, and to take into account the
possibility that without regulatory intervention, environmental liability
insurance may not be available in all circumstances in which it is socially
desirable.2 9 Full exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of this
Note, but one suggestion follows.
To adapt the Shavell model to situations in which non-liability-based
sources of compensation are unavailable, one must simply rethink the
model's conclusion that in cases in which a polluter may be insolvent or
may escape liability, society should consider forbidding liability insur-
ance. A potential alternative recommendation for such circumstances is
not to forbid liability insurance at the outset, but instead to require proof
of solvency.no Under such a requirement, any firm wishing to engage in
an activity known to pose a significant pollution risk is obligated to prove
to regulators that it has the funds necessary to cover expected losses prior
to receiving a license to operate.2 11 Imposing a proof-of-solvency re-
249 A different approach to improving the fit between the Shavell model and questions
of environmental liability is to improve the availability of non-liability-based ftnding
sources to cover the costs of environmental accidents. Although true first-party insurance
may not be possible in cases involving public rather than private losses, see supra notes
233-234 and accompanying text, other compensation schemes are possible. For example,
CERCLA creates a "'Superfund' from taxes on the oil and chemical industries to provide
for cleanup of sites where financially solvent and liable polluters [cannot] not be
identified." Matthew J. Lawlor, Super Settlements for Superfund: A New Paradigm for
Voluntary Settlement, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 123, 128 (1999); see also CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9611 (1994). The pros and cons of CERCLA's approach to funding environmental
cleanups have been discussed thoroughly in the literature. See, e.g., ANALYZING SUPTR-
FUND, supra note 118. For purposes of this discussion, the important point is that in situa-
tions in which such a non-liability-based source of funds to cover the costs of environ-
mental accidents is available, the Shavell model's emphasis on the deterrence and risk-
spreading functions of liability insurance is less objectionable.
205 See generally Kehne, supra note 96 (discussing the potential benefits of financial
responsibility requirements and insurance-based incentives for deterring environmental
accidents).
231 Numerous environmental statutes already incorporate some form of financial re-
sponsibility requirement. See id. at 403 n.1 (listing the various "provisions mandating or
expressly authorizing financial responsibility requirements in federal statutes that seek to
control environmental harms"). Such statutes include the Resource Compensation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(t) (1994) (requiring that treatment storage and
disposal facilities provide proof of solvency for the costs closing and/or cleaning up the
facilities); OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2716 (1994) (requiring that any vessel shipping oil in the U.S.
exclusive economic zone "establish and maintain ... evidence of financial responsibility
sufficient to meet the maximum amount of liability to which the responsible party could be
subjected under other sections of the Act); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1257(0 (1994) (requiring permit applicants to obtain liability
insurance adequate to provide for personal injury and property damage); and the Price-
Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994) (providing that operators of nuclear power plants
"have and maintain financial protection of such type and in such amounts as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ... shall require ... to cover public liability claims"). Some state
statutes also impose financial responsibility requirements on certain corporations operating
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quirement not only guarantees the availability of funds to cover the costs
of pollution accidents and encourages the creation of an environmental
liability insurance market, 25- but also preserves the deterrence effect of
liability (and decreases the risk of accidents) at least as well as the Shav-
ell model's recommendation that insurance be proscribed. "
A proof-of-solvency requirement preserves the deterrence effect of
liability and decreases accident frequency in several ways, most of which
arise because such a requirement encourages firms to purchase full rather
than partial insurance coverage. First, in the case of a potentially judg-
ment-proof injurer, such a requirement eliminates "insolvency as a means
of externalizing accident costs." s That is, as long as firms choose to
prove solvency through insurance or some other method whose cost
reflects the ex ante risk of loss, a firm that might otherwise have chosen
to "cut corners on safety expenditures with the expectation that any dam-
ages exceeding the firm's net worth will be borne by third parties" will
instead have an "incentive[ ] to invest in specific loss-avoidance meas-
ures."5 5 This result does, however, depend on insurers' ability to monitor
insureds' level of care and to adjust insurance premiums accordingly. "
In addition to the immediate deterrence effects of full insurance in
situations in which the insurer can monitor the insured's level of care, a
proof-of-solvency requirement also changes the calculus for a judgment-
proof firm considering the purchase of insurance even in situations in
within the state. See, e.g., David G. Dicknan, Recent Developments in the Criminal En-
forcement of Maritime Environmental Laws, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 39 t1999) (noting that
after enactment of OPA, "many states amended their oil spill laws, mostly to impose higher
liability or stricter financial responsibility requirements").
CERCLA does not directly require an ex ante showing of financial responsibility but
instead provides for a federal lien on property "subject to or affected by a removal or re-
medial action" up to the amount of "costs and damages for which a person is liable to the
United States under" the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 607(1) (1994). Of course, if these costs and
damages exceed the value of the affected property, this provision does not solve the prob-
lems posed by an insolvent insured.
252 Note, however, that this is not an automatic result. One of the controversies sur-
rounding financial responsibility requirements in environmental statutes relates to the pos-
sibility that "the periodic unavailability of insurance... creatles] the possibility of a shut-
down" of the regulated industry. Eric Biber, Erploring Regulator)' Options for Controlling
the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the United States. 18 VA. EN'.TL. LJ. 375,
423 (1999).
25 3 To ensure this result, however, it is important that statutory financial responsibility
requirements be carefully drafted. For further analysis of the issue in the context of
CERCLA and RCRA's proof of solvency requirements, see Kehne. supra note 96. at 424.
For a general critique of OPA's financial responsibility requirement, see Lawrence 1. Kiern,
Liability Compensation, and Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L. 1.481 (2000).2s4 Kehne, supra note 96, at 405.
255 Id.
256 See id. at 403. The Shavell model recognizes the deterrence effect of full insurance
in this situation. See supra Part II.C.7 (suggesting that society may choose to require full
insurance in situations in which insureds may be judgment proof and insurers can monitor
insureds' level of care).
Harvard Environmental Law Review
which the insurer cannot monitor the insured's actions. As discussed ear-
lier, a firm that expects to be judgment proof will likely choose to "pur-
chase less than complete coverage, or no coverage at all," depending on
its level of risk aversion and its assets relative to the expected value of
the losses it may cause.257 If the firm is required to prove at the outset that
it has access to sufficient funds to cover a significant loss, however, it
may instead choose to purchase full coverage with a significant deducti-
ble-particularly if the firm recognizes that it can use the money it saved
by accepting the deductible to take cost-effective measures to reduce the
risk of loss. In turn, the high deductible will increase the firm's exposure
to loss, thereby reducing the moral hazard associated with the full insur-
ance coverage.
21
Further, a proof-of-solvency requirement also decreases the level of
accidents in situations in which a firm may either be insolvent or escape
liability by increasing the cost of, and in turn reducing the demand for,
"goods or services produced through processes that create significant
accident risks."259 Importantly, unlike the two effects discussed above,
this reduction in demand for the firm's end product will decrease the risk
of accidents by decreasing the injurer's activity level even in cases in
which the injurer might at the outset expect to escape liability. In addi-
tion, this effect on the firm's activity level is independent of the degree to
which the insurer can monitor the firm's level of care.26
Finally, because a proof-of-solvency requirement may induce judg-
ment-proof firms (or firms that expect to escape liability) to purchase
more insurance coverage than they otherwise would, such a requirement
also increases insurers' incentive to "contribute ... to effective risk man-
agement" by sponsoring "research and inspection programs."26' That is,
Shavell's observation that insureds should generally be willing either to
provide information about risk levels and levels of care to insurers, or to
pay insurers to collect such information themselves,2 62 can become a
257 Shavell, Regulation of Insurance, supra note 5, at 10; see also supra Part II.C.7.
25 As suggested in the text, the resulting decrease in moral hazard will occur even if
the insurer cannot adequately monitor the firm's level of care because the high deductible
exposes the firm to loss, thereby increasing the firm's incentive to exercise care regardless
of other terms in the policy.
259 Kehne, supra note 96, at 405.
260 Of course, this effect cannot be fine-tuned unless the proof-of-solvency requirement
and/or the price of the firm's liability insurance is tied to level of care. That is, if a widget
firm with risky practices and a widget firm with safer practices sell widgets at the same
price initially and must both purchase the same amount of insurance at the same price in
order to meet the proof-of-solvency requirement, then consumers will receive no price
signal as to which widget-producer uses safer procedures-with the result that the safer
firm might abandon its safe practices (assuming they are costly) to obtain a price advantage
over the less safe firm. Overall demand for widgets will still fall as a result of the imposi-
tion of the proof-of-solvency requirement, but this may be an appropriate market response
if there is a substitute for widgets that can be produced more safely.
261 Kehne, supra note 96, at 406-07.
262 See supra Part II.C.7.
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factor in the case of an insured who may be judgment proof or escape
liability if the insured is required to prove solvency prior to engaging in
risky activities.23
Thus, several rationales support altering the Shavell model's default
recommendation in situations involving environmental losses in which
the insured may become judgment proof or escape liability. If one simply
replaces the model's recommendation that society should consider for-
bidding insurance in these situations with the recommendation that soci-
ety should instead require proof of solvency, one would not only secure
funds to cover environmental losses and cleanup costs, but also reduce
the level of accidents and preserve the deterrence effects of liability. 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Although there are signs that the market for environmental insurance
has improved somewhat in recent years, 2 - the trend in the previous dec-
ades was decidedly downward, with insurers continually revising old and
introducing new coverage provisions to limit exposure for environmental
losses.' 6 Analysis under the Shavell model suggests that at least some
aspects of this historic downward trend are unobjectionable, resulting as
they do from the existing statutory liability regime for pollution events
and from inherent characteristics of those events, which combine to cre-
ate unique problems for insurance markets, including high levels of un-
certainty in estimating potential losses and a high risk that insureds will
be judgment proof or will escape liability entirely.
In spite of the model's optimistic predictions, however, the continu-
ing absence of a well-working market for environmental insurance poses
serious problems for victims and taxpayers, who bear the brunt of un-
compensated losses. The Shavell model downplays these problems, in
- But see Kehne, supra note 96, at 423 (observing that pollution insurers have sho%% n
"reluctance to undertake aggressive research and risk management programs"l. Kehne
ultimately dismisses these concerns, however, concluding that "there is no basis for pro-
jecting that hazardous waste facilities subject to stringent financial responsibility require-
ments would be unable to obtain coverage on terms that assign appropriate prices to the
risks that these facilities create.' Id.
261 Of course, such a change in the Shavell model would not significantly alter the
analysis of the CGL policy disputes discussed above because those coverage disputes all
arose in situations in which there was no ex ante proof-of-solvency requirement. Never-
theless, requiring firms to prove solvency before they engage in environmentally risky
activities could prevent similar coverage disputes from arising in the future.
21See Waeger & Fersko, supra note 118, at 579 ("[l]n response to the growing de-
mand, a limited number of insurance companies now issue liability policies offering pro-
tection against specified environmental risk.")
2
6See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
2 The absence of a well-working environmental insurance market may also present a
problem for society because risk-averse individuals who would otherwise be willing to
undertake socially beneficial but environmentally risky ventures-such as operation of a
treatment facility for toxic wastes-may be deterred from such ventures merely by the
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part because it underemphasizes the compensation function of insurance.
This bias may be reasonable in many insurance contexts because first-
party insurance is available to compensate victims of loss. In the envi-
ronmental context, however, there are no ready analogs to first-party in-
surance, necessitating use of a model that better accounts for the com-
pensation function of liability insurance. One possible adaptation to the
Shavell model is to incorporate a recommendation that parties be re-
quired to prove solvency before engaging in environmentally risky ac-
tivities. Such a recommendation would not solve the existing problems
regarding use and interpretation of the CGL policy in the pollution con-
text, but it would improve the Shavell model's usefulness as a tool for
evaluating insurance disputes in contexts-like environmental acci-
dents-that involve significant public losses.
absence of adequate insurance. See supra note 28. This Note largely ignores this effect,
both here and in previous discussions, in part because the effect is difficult to quantify
relative to the conflicting effects of moral hazard and adverse selection.
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